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INTRODUCTION
Apps, gigs, platforms, smart contracts. When emerging technologies
change the way in which businesses and individuals conduct familiar transactions, questions naturally arise as to whether and how existing law governs the
new models.1 As the lawmaking process struggles to catch up to new methods
of doing business, the new methods become popular with consumers and businesses, sometimes entrenching a model that resists regulation.2
Secured lending has not escaped this phenomenon. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which governs loans secured by personal property collateral, allows a lender, after its borrower’s default, to take possession
of the collateral without judicial process in order to sell that collateral to satisfy
the debt.3 If the collateral is property used in a business, the lender is permitted
to disable the collateral in anticipation of selling that collateral in place.4 The
UCC limits these rights, however, by allowing the lender to avoid court only if
it can take or disable the collateral without causing a breach of the peace.5 This
1

See, e.g., Nakita Q. Cuttino, The Rise of “FringeTech”: Regulatory Risks in Earned-Wage
Access, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1509 (2021) (questioning whether an app that gives employees access to a portion of their wages before payday is a new financial tool or a type of
payday lending); Charlotte Garden, Disrupting Work Law: Arbitration in the Gig Economy,
2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 205 (2017) (asking whether “gig” enterprises “become the employers of some or all of [their] workers, or . . . should we regard these workers as newly
minted micro-entrepreneurs?”); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87,
95–97 (2016) (listing various industries, such as hotels, office space, and grocery shopping,
that have been affected by the “platform economy” and reporting on Airbnb’s arguments that
existing laws do not capture its business model); Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 316–318 (2017) (addressing claims that smart contracts will replace contract law).
2 For example, when the Canadian province of Quebec implemented rules requiring Airbnb
hosts to register their properties with the provincial tax authority, Airbnb responded that the
province had created “red tape, bureaucracy and needless friction for every day people.”
Raquel Fletcher, Quebec Announces New Regulations for Airbnb Rentals, GLOBAL NEWS
(June 5, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://globalnews.ca/news/5356642/quebec-new-airbnbregulations/ [perma.cc/B6P8-4PQJ].
3 U.C.C. §§ 9-609(a)(1), 9-610(a)–(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020).
4 Id. § 9-609(a)(2).
5 Id. § 9-609(b)(2). Article 2A of the UCC contains a similar provision that applies to leases
of goods. See id. § 2A-525 (2)–(3) (allowing a lessor to repossess leased goods from a defaulting lessee without judicial process only if it can do so without causing a breach of the
peace).
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is an important limitation; self-help remedies to recover possession of property
are rare and run the risk of disturbing the public order.6 Today’s electronic
technologies that allow a lender to remotely interfere with a borrower’s possession of collateral by electronically disabling it upon default test the boundaries
of these rules.
A creditor’s ability to electronically disable collateral is not a future fantasy. Two decades before the explosion in scholarship about smart contracts,7
writers discussed the use of such technology to enforce creditors’ rights in collateral. The proto-smart contract example, the one used in 1997 by cryptocurrency and smart contracts pioneer Nick Szabo to explain the mechanics and use
cases for smart contracts, was the automated disablement of a car by a creditor
holding a lien on that car.8 Indeed, subprime automobile lenders have been disabling collateral upon the debtor’s failure to pay since the 1990s despite the
fact that the use of electronic means to disable collateral exists in a gray area of
commercial law.9 The UCC is silent with respect to the use of this remedy in
loans secured by consumer goods, and the disablement remedy authorized
when the collateral is business property was created in an era in which disablement was neither electronic nor remote, and is cabined by an ill-fitting
breach of the peace standard.10 In the absence of clear guidance, the practice of
electronic disablement has grown, and the methods have become increasingly
6

See Richard A. Epstein, The Theory and Practice of Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1,
27–29 (2005) (discussing the use of self-help by landlords to evict defaulting tenants and by
persons in hot pursuit of the person who has wrongly dispossessed the pursuer of goods).
7 The term smart contract is unfortunate; a smart contract is a piece of computer code that
can execute a contractual obligation, not a contract itself. See Adam J. Kolber, Not-So-Smart
Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198, 208–210
(2018) (explaining how smart contracts work). For recent scholarship on smart contracts,
see, for example, Jonathan G. Rohr, Smart Contracts and Traditional Contract Law, or: The
Law of the Vending Machine, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71 (2019); Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule,
Online Dispute Resolution for Smart Contracts, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 103 (2019); Werbach &
Cornell, supra note 1.
8 Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY
(Sept. 1, 1997), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469 [perma.cc/J64E-7T3M].
9 A high-profile early adopter of the technology was former Detroit Lions halfback Mel
Farr, who was once the owner of the largest group of black-owned car dealerships in the
United States. See Brent Snavely & David Sedgwick, Debts, Lawsuit Cloud Farr’s Future,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Apr. 1, 2002, 12:00 AM), https://www.autonews.com/article/20020401/
ANA/204010774/debts-lawsuit-cloud-farr-s-future [https://perma.cc/6DDS-6PS6].
10
U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(2)–(b)(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020) (permitting a secured party to render equipment unusable if it can do so without a breach of the peace); id.
§ 9-102(a)(33) (excluding consumer goods from the definition of equipment). Although the
right to disable equipment collateral has been in the UCC since the first Official Text,
U.C.C. § 9-503 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1952), the breach of the peace limitation
was not added until 1999. See Timothy R. Zinnecker, The Default Provisions of Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I, 54 BUS. LAW. 1113, 1148–49 (1999) (explaining that “[r]evised Article 9 expressly requires the creditor to avoid breaching the
peace” when disabling collateral).
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automated.11 As more and more goods are connected to networks that enable
sellers to retain control over them after sale,12 the possibility of automated disablement will only increase in both consumer and business transactions. Selfhelp repossession has traditionally been most common in consumer and other
small dollar secured transactions,13 but the ability to remotely disable goods
may make disablement a desired remedy in even large transactions.14
This Article will make the case for including remote disablement in the
UCC as a creditor’s remedy and discuss possible limitations on its use. The
time is ripe; in 2019, the co-sponsoring bodies of the UCC—the American Law
Institute and the Uniform Law Commission—appointed a committee to study
the feasibility of amending the UCC to accommodate and govern the use of
emerged and emerging technologies in commercial transactions.15 Moreover,
11

Today’s “kill switches” include GPS technology that allows the creditor to disable the
cars remotely. See Elaine S. Povich, Late Payment? A ‘Kill Switch’ Can Strand You and
Your Car, STATELINE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
blogs/stateline/2018/11/27/late-payment-a-kill-switch-can-strand-you-and-your-car
[https://perma.cc/C69B-3E2A]; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving That Car, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/miss-a-payment-good-luck-moving-that-car/
[https://perma.cc/2C39-NFRR] (explaining that lenders retain the “ultimate control” over
collateral “[b]y simply clicking a mouse or tapping a smartphone”).
12 Authors describe tangible goods susceptible to remote control as “smart goods” that form
the “Internet of Things.” See JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE
NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM 16 (2017) (“Smart property is software-enhanced . . . personal property.”). When linked together, smart goods create the Internet of Things. Stacy-Ann Elvy,
Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 840 (2016) (describing the Internet of Things as “a network of products, systems, and platforms connected through enabled devices that collect, store, and
communicate with other devices, cloud software, on-site infrastructure, and individuals to
maximize efficiency”); Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The Tethered Economy, 87 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 783, 790 (2019) (“When the functionality of a product or service is dictated by software, a developer can decide not only who uses it, but when, how, and where they do so with
remarkable precision.”); Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability
Standards to Address Corporate Remote Interference, 69 DUKE L.J. 583, 595 (2019) (observing that buyers of Internet of Things devices enter into a relationship with the IoT company
that is “characterized by a new power dynamic—and a new risk of property and bodily
harm”).
13 See Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in Commercial
Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 558 (1997).
14 See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 190 (2017) (predicting that technological tools tested on poor
people will become common in all transactions); Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., supra note 12,
at 806 (explaining that tethering could make new economic models possible); Sarah Jeong,
How Technology Helps Creditors Control Debtors, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/rental-company-control/478365/
[https://perma.cc/2ZTQ-H2KN] (explaining the expansion of digital rights management
from a method of controlling intellectual property rights to a method of controlling access to
physical goods).
15 That committee has become a drafting committee. See Uniform Commercial Code and
Emerging Technologies Committee, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
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two states have enacted non-uniform amendments to the UCC to address remote disablement, and a handful of others have restricted the practice in their
laws governing consumer lending.16
Given the law’s general disdain for self-help remedies, the reality that a
disablement is an interference with the debtor’s possession, and the impossibility of anticipating automated shutoff of collateral when Article 9 was first
drafted, this Article will demonstrate that it is not permitted in consumer transactions under the UCC as enacted in its uniform version. Although the language of Article 9 is broad enough to permit automated disablement in business
transactions, the remedy is cabined by an ill-fitting breach of the peace standard
designed for an era in which disablement required physical contact with the
item being disabled. Recognizing, however, that creditors are using this remedy
in consumer transactions and that the existing standard for permissible disablement in business transactions does not anticipate remote disablement, this
Article will discuss interests that policymakers should consider when evaluating how to include remote disablement in the secured creditor’s list of remedies.17
Part I will introduce automated disablement by discussing its use in subprime automobile lending transactions and discussing the judicial opinions and
regulatory actions addressing its use. Part II will illustrate how current statutory
law treats remote disablement, and Part III will discuss the states that have
modified their laws to accommodate remote disablement. Part IV will discuss
the limitations that the law places on the exercise of self-help remedies to recover property and the interests that are protected by those limitations. Part V
will discuss interests that can be harmed when a repossession or disablement
crosses the digital–physical divide and suggest limitations on the practice tailored to those harms. Part VI will conclude that automated disablement is sufficiently different from self-help repossession and face-to-face disablement that
it should be addressed in Article 9 of the UCC with restrictions tailored to the
practice.

committees/community-home?CommunityKey=cb5f9e0b-7185-4a33-9e4c-1f79ba560c71
[https://perma.cc/VWA6-PBDB].
16 See infra Part III.
17 This policy question has been festering for more than twenty years, having last surfaced
during the drafting process for several UCC articles in the 1990s, see Esther C. Roditti, Is
Self-Help a Lawful Contractual Remedy?, 21 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 431, 452–55
(1995) (discussing proposed amendments to Article 2 of the UCC that would have expanded
the article’s scope to include software); Michael L. Rustad & Elif Kavusturan, A Commercial Law for Software Contracting, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 775, 798, 856 (2019) (explaining that early drafts of UCC Article 2B, which became the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, permitted electronic self-help), and the Uniform Consumer Leases Act.
See Ralph J. Rohner, Leasing Consumer Goods: The Spotlight Shifts to the Uniform Consumer Leases Act, 35 CONN. L. REV. 647, 735–37 (2003) (describing the negotiations over
including the then-new practice of electronic self-help in the Uniform Consumer Leases Act
and concluding that “[w]e can expect more skirmishes in this area”).
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AUTOMATED DISABLEMENT TODAY

Subprime auto lending provides a current example of automated disablement in practice. Supporters of the practice recognize that its users operate in a
legal vacuum in most jurisdictions but argue that automated disablement is
consistent with UCC policies.18 To summarize one argument, if one views disablement as a repossession, the UCC permits it and it avoids breaching the
peace; if one views disablement as a remedy distinct from repossession, its use
is also consistent with Article 9 policies because Article 9 permits the disablement of equipment.19
A. Disabling Cars
Automobile lenders started using disablement of collateral as a remedy in
subprime lending transactions in the late 1990s. Lenders disabled cars by the
use of starter interrupt devices installed in financed vehicles. The use of the early versions of these devices was neither automated nor remote. In the early days
of starter interrupt devices, the debtor received a code every time she made a
payment and the code enabled her to start the car until the next payment was
due.20 Today’s more sophisticated payment assurance devices are able to disable a car remotely using GPS technology.21
In the absence of clear legal guidance on the use of starter interrupt technologies, the payment assurance industry developed standards for their use. In
2009, the manufacturers of payment assurance devices established the Payment
Assurance Technology Association to develop these best practices.22 The resulting practices were published in two documents, the PATA Ethical Stand-

18

Thomas B. Hudson & Daniel J. Laudicina, The Emerging Law of Starter Interrupt Devices, 61 BUS. LAW. 843, 843 (2006).
19 Id. at 845.
20 See Hampton v. Yam’s Choice Plus Autos, Inc. (In re Hampton), 319 B.R. 163, 165–67
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005) (explaining the operation of a payment assurance device); Hudson
& Laudicina, supra note 18, at 843–44 (explaining the operation of payment assurance devices).
21 See,
e.g.,
PassTime
Elite
GPS
Tracking
Solution,
PASSTIME,
https://passtimegps.com/solutions/elite/ [https://perma.cc/LE2S-YLGZ] (vendor website explaining the features of the PassTime Elite GPS tracking and assured payment system solution); Nationwide Acceptance LLC, LoanPlus GPS and Starter Interrupt System Disclosure
and Agreement for Installation (on file with author) [hereinafter Nationwide Disclosure and
Agreement] (explaining that the device’s starter interrupt functionality allows the lender to
remotely disable the vehicle’s starter in the event of a default by the borrower); In re Franklin, 614 B.R. 534, 540–41 n.11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2020) (explaining the operation of a remote “kill switch”).
22 See Roger, Vehicle Payment Assurance Industry Establishes Association, TU
AUTOMOTIVE (Jan. 28, 2009), https://www.tu-auto.com/vehicle-payment-assurance-industryestablishes-association/ [https://perma.cc/UV9Q-LF3T]; Terry O’Loughlin, Not Your Father’s Payment Assurance Device—A Plea to Regulators, P&A MAG. (June 10, 2015),
https://www.providers-administrators.com/348185/not-your-fathers-payment-assurancedevice-a-plea-to-regulators [https://perma.cc/DP7U-CM67].
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ards23 and the Standards for Manufacture and Utilization of Devices for Starter
Interrupt/GPS Tracking in Consumer Financial Transactions.24 The primary duty that the industry members committed to in these documents is disclosure; in
both the ethical standards and the manufacture and use standards, the association members commit to disclose the existence of the device on financed vehicles and to explain the purpose of the devices.25 In the manufacturing standards,
the members also promise to explain the proper functioning of the devices and
to inform the consumer about override procedures.26
The contracts that creditors use in connection with disabling devices reflect
the practices established by the payment assurance technology industry. The
contracts contain some common elements. The following observations are
based on a small survey of contracts that finance companies use when they
equip financed automobiles with starter interrupt devices.27 All of the companies surveyed require their borrowers to sign a document acknowledging the
borrower’s knowledge that installation of the device is a condition of the loan.
Creditors require the car owner borrowers to acknowledge that the devices will
prevent the car from starting if the borrower misses a payment.28 Some of the
contracts provide borrower protections. Several promise to give the borrower
notice before disabling the vehicle.29 Some lenders allow limited emergency
access to the disabled vehicle.30
The contracts illustrate the spectrum of remedies to which the creditor can
resort upon the debtor’s failure to pay. The remedies range from a system of
23

Payment Assurance Tech. Ass’n, PATA Ethical Standards (2015) (on file with author)
[hereinafter PATA Ethical Standards].
24 Payment Assurance Tech. Ass’n, Standards for Manufacture and Utilization of Devices
for Starter Interrupt/GPS Tracking in Consumer Financial Transactions (Jan. 2012) (on file
with author) [hereinafter PATA Manufacture Standards].
25 PATA Ethical Standards, supra note 23; PATA Manufacture Standards, supra note 24.
26 PATA Manufacture Standards, supra note 24.
27 See PassTime GPS, Payment Assurance System Disclosure Statement and Agreement for
Installation (on file with author) [hereinafter PassTime Disclosure and Agreement]; Crossbow Grp., Inc., Agreement for Installation of the ReCaP ‘Extreme’ Payment Assurance System and Disclosure Statement to Customer (on file with author) [hereinafter ReCaP ‘Extreme’ Agreement]; Nationwide Disclosure and Agreement, supra note 21; Pinnacle Fin.
Grp., Starter Interrupt and Locator Device Acknowledgment (on file with author) [hereinafter Pinnacle Device Acknowledgment]; People’s Credit, Buyer’s Agreement for Installation
and Disclosure of GPS Device (on file with author) [hereinafter People’s Credit Agreement].
28 See PassTime Disclosure and Agreement, supra note 27; ReCaP ‘Extreme’ Agreement,
supra note 27; Nationwide Disclosure and Agreement, supra note 21; Pinnacle Device Acknowledgment, supra note 27; W. Funding, GPS Disclosure Form (on file with author)
[hereinafter Western Funding Disclosure].
29 Nationwide Disclosure and Agreement, supra note 21; ReCaP ‘Extreme’ Agreement, supra note 27; Western Funding Disclosure, supra note 28 (“[The lender] may remind [the borrower] that a payment is coming due or past due by sending an audible tone through the Device.” (emphasis added)).
30 ARA GPS Sys., Customer Agreement and Disclosure Statement for Installation of Starter
Interrupt/GPS Device, (on file with author) [hereinafter ARA Customer Disclosure]; Western Funding Disclosure, supra note 28. Nationwide Disclosure and Agreement, supra note
21.
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automated payment alerts31 to physical repossession.32 This spectrum illustrates
the difference between remedies against the debtor, which are not governed by
Article 9 of the UCC, and remedies against the collateral, which are covered by
Article 9. Some contracts emphasize the payment assurance role.33 The UCC is
silent on those creditor actions, as they are remedies taken against the debtor
and not against the property. One contract reminds the vehicle owner that the
purpose of the warning is to give the owner the opportunity to make a payment.34 At the other end is the traditional repossession, unquestionably governed and limited by the UCC because it is an action to recover collateral. Although the threat of seizing collateral can coerce payment, blurring the line
between the two types of remedies, only creditors with an interest in property—
secured creditors—are entitled to seize that property.35
The contracts distinguish disablement from repossession. For example, two
contracts warn that if the borrower fails to cure the default that triggered the
disablement, the lender “may take any action permitted by law . . . including
THE RIGHT TO REPOSSESS.”36 Another notifies the borrower that the lender, after disablement, may use the starter interrupt device’s GPS technology “to
locate the vehicle for repossession.”37 While the contracts distinguish disablement from repossession, some also acknowledge that the purpose of starter interrupt devices is to protect a creditor’s interest in property.38
As a remedy against property, disablement should be governed by the laws
governing secured transactions. There is very little case law on the issue, and
all of the cases arose in bankruptcy courts. The next Section describes those
cases.
31

ReCaP ‘Extreme’ Agreement, supra note 27 (“The system may remind me of payments
due and/or past due via E Mail, SMS Text, IVR, and/or in-vehicle beeper.”); Nationwide
Disclosure and Agreement, supra note 21 (“A warning from the [d]evice will be provided to
you no less than 48 hours before the starter interrupt capability of the [d]evice is activated to
disable the Vehicle’s starter.”); Western Funding Disclosure, supra note 28 (“[W]e may remind you that a payment is coming due or past due by sending an audible tone through the
Device.”).
32 ARA Customer Disclosure, supra note 30 (“[W]e may take any action as permitted under
applicable law, including THE RIGHT TO REPOSSESS THE VEHICLE.”); Nationwide
Disclosure and Agreement, supra note 21 (“[W]e may take any action as permitted under
applicable law, including exercising our RIGHT TO REPOSSESS THE VEHICLE.”); Western Funding Disclosure, supra note 28 (“We may use the Device’s GPS to locate the Vehicle
for repossession . . . .”).
33 People’s Credit Agreement, supra note 27 (“The Device is designed to ensure that you
make your payments on time in accordance with the Sales Contract.”).
34 Nationwide Disclosure and Agreement, supra note 21.
35 See U.C.C. § 9-609 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
36 ARA Customer Disclosure, supra note 30; Nationwide Disclosure and Agreement, supra
note 21.
37 Western Funding Disclosure, supra note 28; see also Pinnacle Device Acknowledgment,
supra note 27 (explaining consequences that may occur if the vehicle is “electronically disabled or repossessed”).
38 ARA Customer Disclosure, supra note 30 (“The [v]ehicle has been equipped with a starter interrupt device with GPS capabilities.”).
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B. Automated Disablement in the Courts: Bankruptcy and the Automatic Stay
Few courts have addressed the use of remote disablement of goods as a
creditor remedy. Those that have are bankruptcy courts that considered whether
the use of payment assurance devices by automobile lenders violates the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay.39 The automatic stay, which is effective at the
moment a debtor files for bankruptcy, prohibits all entities from taking a wide
range of actions against the debtor and the debtor’s property.40 The Bankruptcy
Code enumerates the different types of prohibited actions: commencement of
legal proceedings, acts to obtain possession of property of the estate, acts to exercise control over property of the estate, acts to enforce liens against the debtor’s property or property of the estate, and “any act to collect, assess, or recover
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of” the bankruptcy case.41 Although there is a long list of prohibited acts, they can be divided into two categories: actions to establish or enforce personal liability on a
claim and actions to establish or enforce the liability of property for a claim.
The bankruptcy courts that have addressed the issue all agree that the use of
payment assurance devices to disable collateral are acts that interfere with the
debtor’s property interest in the collateral.
The bankruptcy court in Hampton v. Yam’s Choice Plus Autos, Inc. (In re
Hampton)42 focused on the automatic shutoff device as an act of control over
property of the bankruptcy estate.43 The opinion in that case contains a detailed
description of how early payment assurance devices operated.44 The creditor in
Hampton had used a PayTeck device, which required the debtor to provide a
code periodically in order to start her car.45 The debtor had committed at the
outset to make monthly payments on her loan, and the lender promised to provide a new code after receipt of each monthly payment.46 The PayTeck device
was programmed to require a new code every thirty days; if the debtor either
did not have a code because of a missed payment or was given an incorrect
39

In re Franklin, 614 B.R. 534, 544 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2020); Grisard-Van Roey v. Auto
Credit Ctr., Inc. (In re Grisard-Van Roey), 373 B.R. 441, 444–45 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007);
Hampton v. Yam’s Choice Plus Autos, Inc. (In re Hampton), 319 B.R. 163, 172 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 2005); In re Horace, No. 14-30103, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2886, at *11–13 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2015); In re Garner, No. 09-81998, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 721, at *8–10
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2010); Dawson v. J&B Detail, LLC (In re Dawson), No. 0522369, Adv. No. 05-1463, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4396, at *19–20 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 28,
2006).
40 11 U.S.C. § 362. The stay protects the debtor, all property of the debtor, and all property
of the bankruptcy estate.
41 Id.
42 In re Hampton, 319 B.R. at 163.
43 This is a curious choice because in most chapter 13 cases, the property vests in the debtor
immediately upon confirmation of the plan. In the plan at issue, the property remained estate
property until the plan was completed. Id. at 171 n.6.
44 Id. at 166–67.
45 Id. at 166.
46 Id. at 165–66.
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code, the car would not start.47 The debtor in that case found that the automatic
shutoff device on her car prevented her from starting the car after she filed for
bankruptcy.48
The issue before the court in Hampton was whether the stay violation was
willful on the part of the lender, but the court’s analysis of how automatic
shutoff devices fit within the panoply of creditor remedies is useful. The court
observed that the automated shutoff device gave the creditor a mechanism for
exercising control over the debtor’s property,49 but that the existence of the
shutoff device on the debtor’s car by itself was not a violation of the automatic
stay.50 The creditor’s policy after a bankruptcy was filed was to require the
debtor to call in every month to receive a new code. Because the debtor had the
burden of asking for the code every month, the court found that the creditor’s
bankruptcy policy created a stay violation.51 According to the court, once the
debtor filed for bankruptcy, she should have been free to use her car without
interference by the creditor until the creditor obtained relief from the automatic
stay.52
Two years later, another bankruptcy judge distinguished the mere existence
of a payment assurance device on a vehicle with the use of that device to exercise control over the car. Like the court in Hampton, the judge in Grisard-Van
Roey v. Auto Credit Center Inc. (In re Grisard-Van Roey) held that the creditor
did not violate the stay by leaving the device on the debtor’s car after the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.53 Because the creditor in that case provided the correct
monthly codes to the debtor after the bankruptcy filing, the creditor avoided
exercising control over the vehicle and thus did not violate the stay.54 Like the
court in Hampton, the court in Grisard-Van Roey considered the use of a payment assurance device to disable a vehicle to be a method of interfering with
the debtor’s possessory rights in the collateral.
Several other opinions analyzed the different debt collection functions of a
payment assurance device. In re Horace55 was also an automatic stay case; in
that case, the court found a violation of both § 362(a)(3), which stays any act
“to exercise control over property of the estate,” and § 362(a)(6), which stays
any act to collect a claim against the debtor that arose before the bankruptcy.56
After describing the operation of the payment assurance device at issue, the
court found that the creditor’s use of the device after the debtor filed for bankruptcy violated both subsections. The court analogized the warning sounds that
47

Id. at 166–67.
Id. at 166.
49 Id. at 172.
50 Id. at 174.
51 Id. at 172.
52 Id.
53 Grisard-Van Roey v. Auto Credit Ctr., Inc. (In re Grisard-Van Roey), 373 B.R. 441, 444
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2007).
54 Id.
55 In re Horace, No. 14-30103, 2015 WL 5145576 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2015).
56 Id. at *3–4 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)).
48
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the payment device emitted before payment was due to sending the debtor a
monthly statement with a payment coupon.57 In addition, the court found that
the creditor’s continued use of the device after bankruptcy was an act to exercise control over property of the estate.58 The court stressed that the latter stay
violation was “particularly evident on the several occasions when Debtors’ Vehicle was rendered inoperable.”59 Another bankruptcy court, in Dawson v. J&B
Detail, LLC (In re Dawson), made a similar distinction between the use of a
payment assurance device as an act to collect a debt (a blinking light to alert the
debtor that payment was due) and an act to exercise control over estate property
(in disabling the debtor’s vehicle).60
Although none of the bankruptcy court opinions addressed whether automated disablement is permitted by the UCC, their holdings are clear that disablement is a remedy against property, not a remedy to enforce personal liability. As such, they support the position that disablement should be governed by
Article 9.
C. The Automated Repossessor and the Regulators
Regulators in a handful of states have issued formal and informal advice
regarding the use of starter interrupt devices. The communications from various
Attorney General’s offices illustrate the lack of legal clarity regarding disablement as a creditor’s remedy. In 1999, the Iowa Attorney General’s Office, in
concluding that starter interrupt devices were not permitted under the Iowa
Consumer Credit Code and the UCC, characterized the use of a starter interrupt
device as a method of effectuating the “functional equivalent” of a repossession.61 After classifying disablement as a form of repossession, the office’s letter catalogued several occurrences that could be viewed as a prohibited breach
of the peace.62 The listed occurrences were ones that jeopardized the safety of
the debtor–driver and drivers of nearby autos; the letter warned that “if a wired
car died at a stop sign on a hill . . . in a winter snow, and would not restart because of the device, traffic back-ups or fender-benders would affect not only
the borrower, but other citizens as well.”63 In a later letter, the same office
listed other occurrences that “might run afoul of applicable laws,” such as rendering the owner unable to move the car in an emergency and causing harm to
57

Id. at *4.
Id.
59 Id. The court included in a footnote that the continued existence of the device after bankruptcy was also a violation of § 362(a)(5), which stays any act to enforce a prepetition lien.
Id. at *4 n.3.
60 Dawson v. J&B Detail, LLC (In re Dawson), No. 05-22369, Adv. No. 05-1463, 2006
Bankr. LEXIS 4396, at *19–21 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 28, 2006); see also In re Garner, No.
09-81998, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 721, at *9–11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2010) (explaining
the dual roles of a payment assurance device).
61 Letter from Kathleen Keest, Assistant Att’y Gen. and Deputy Adm’r, Iowa Consumer
Credit Code, State of Iowa Dep’t of Just. (Oct. 22, 1999) (on file with author).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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persons seeking to escape dangerous situations.64 These are not traditional
breach-of-the-peace scenarios, but occurrences that most people would want to
avoid in loan enforcement. That said, merely depriving a defaulting debtor of
the use of collateral runs afoul of no laws, and a person whose car has been repossessed without a breach of the peace similarly will not be able to escape
from a dangerous situation.
In 2007, the Michigan Attorney General’s office wrote a letter analyzing
the legality of starter interrupt devices under that state’s law. In concluding that
it was impossible to render an opinion on the legality of the use of such devices
in all situations, the Attorney General’s office explained the ways in which remote disablement resembles and is different from physical repossession.65 Like
the Iowa Attorney General’s Office letters, the Michigan letter catalogs dangerous disablement scenarios, such as a vehicle being disabled in an unsafe area or a vehicle that is struck or vandalized after disablement. The letter explains
that these dangers are unique to remote disablement—when an item of collateral is physically repossessed, the item is removed from the area in which it is
located and is thus not exposed to the dangers of an unsafe area.66
The payment assurance industry has pushed for clarity from regulators. Yet
that clarity remains elusive. For example, the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions has stated that the use of payment assurance devices to disable
cars is not illegal, but that it must comply with the Wisconsin Consumer Act
and other applicable laws.67 Although proponents of the devices hailed this
statement as a pathway to the use of payment assurance technology in Wisconsin,68 it is not entirely clear how the use of such devices fits within the applicable statutes. As explained in the next Part, the UCC is silent on the use of remote disablement, and replacing the words “take possession” and “repossess”
with “disable” in both the UCC and governing consumer laws can lead to absurd results. For example, a creditor who repossesses a motor vehicle from an
individual in Wisconsin must notify the local law enforcement agency of the
repossession.69 This requirement makes sense because someone whose car has
been repossessed in the traditional sense may think that her car has been stolen.
It does not make sense in the context of remote disablement.
64

Letter from William L. Brauch, Special Assistant Att’y Gen. and Director, Consumer Protector Div., State of Iowa Dep’t of Just. (Dec. 29, 2006) (on file with author).
65 Letter from Carol L. Isaacs, Chief Deputy Att’y Gen., State of Mich. Dep’t of Att’y Gen.,
to State Representative Edward J. Gaffney (Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with author).
66 Id.
67 Installation of GPS and/or Starter Interrupt Technology on a Vehicle, STATE OF WIS.:
DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS. (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.wdfi.org/wca/business_guidance/interpret
ive_opinions/Installation_of_GPS_Device_on_a_Vehicle.htm [https://perma.cc/XAL3-W9
JM]; see also Wisconsin Clarifies Policy on GPS & Payment Assurance Technology, BHPH
REP., Mar./Apr. 2016, at 15, 15.
68 See Wisconsin Clarifies Policy on GPS & Payment Assurance Technology, supra note 67,
at 15 (describing the guidance as “good news for buy-here, pay-here operators who have interests in Wisconsin”).
69 WIS. STAT. § 425.2065(2) (2022).
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II. AUTOMATED DISABLEMENT IN THE STATUTES
Laws governing secured creditors’ remedies permit and restrict self-help
repossession. Repossession is a remedy unique to secured creditors; only those
creditors have bargained for an interest in the debtor’s property at the outset of
the loan transaction.70 Because remote disablement is an interference with the
debtor’s right to possess property, it too is a remedy available only to secured
creditors.71 This Part will explain how the existing law of secured credit, in assuming that all interferences with the debtor’s possession of collateral will be
“contact interferences,” is inadequate to govern the practice of remote disablement.
A. Article 9 of the UCC
Article 9 gives a creditor with a security interest in tangible personal property two self-help remedies upon its debtor’s default. A secured creditor has the
right to take possession of collateral without judicial process if the creditor can
do so without a breach of the peace.72 Article 9 also permits a secured creditor
to render unusable property used in a business upon the debtor’s default.73 Both
the language of the statute itself and the Official Comment provide the reason
for the second remedy: some collateral may be too heavy and complex to remove from the debtor’s place of business,74 and a creditor’s removal and storage costs for such equipment would likely be high.75 The statute therefore allows a secured creditor to disable such equipment in anticipation of selling it on
the debtor’s premises.
Although Article 9 distinguishes between taking possession and rendering
equipment unusable, it treats the two actions identically in one important respect. Whether a creditor disables or takes possession of collateral, if it does so

70

See 1 BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.01 (3d ed. 2022) (“The right to pursue earmarked
property after default is what distinguishes the secured creditor from its unsecured cousin.”).
71 If a creditor with no interest in the debtor’s property disabled that property, the disablement would be a trespass to chattels. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 217 (AM. L. INST.
1965) (defining trespass to chattel as “using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession
of another”); id. § 218 (imposing liability on one who deprives the possessor of the use of
the chattel “for a substantial time”).
72 U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
73 Id. § 9-609(a)(2) (“[A secured party] without removal, may render equipment unusable.”).
The UCC defines “equipment” as “goods other than inventory, farm products or consumer
goods.” Id. § 9-102(a)(33).
74 Id. § 9-609 cmt 6.
75 See William E. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47
MINN. L. REV. 205, 243 (1962) (explaining that allowing the secured party to disable collateral in lieu of removal would reduce the amount of the deficiency); Pierre R. Loiseaux, Default Proceedings Under the Texas Uniform Commercial Code, 44 TEX. L. REV. 702, 704
(1966) (explaining that this section was included to allow the secured party to avoid undesirable expenses in enforcing its security interest).
THE
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without judicial involvement, it must do so without a breach of the peace.76 The
UCC provides no guidance on whether an action constitutes a breach of the
peace, leaving the answer to that question to judicial development.77
In determining whether Article 9 permits automated disablement of collateral, it is important to note two things. First, the section that governs disablement neither permits nor prohibits the remedy in consumer transactions. Second, the disablement remedy was included in the UCC in the 1950s, when
disablement required an individual to enter a place of business to physically
render the collateral unusable.
Because the UCC was designed to adapt to emerging methods of doing
business, it is necessary to ask whether the current language of Article 9 is flexible enough to allow parties to use remote disablement as a remedy upon default. One underlying policy of the UCC is to “permit the continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.”78 At first glance, the text of Article 9 indicates that automated disablement may be a permissible remedy. Seemingly consistent with the UCC policy
of freedom of contract,79 the list of rights granted to the secured creditor by Article 9 is not exhaustive. An Article 9 secured creditor has, after a debtor’s default, the rights enumerated in Article 9 and any rights “provided by agreement
of the parties.”80 The first two versions of the Official Text of Article 9 did not
explicitly permit parties to define post-default rights by agreement.81 Although
the first Official Text enumerated the rights of the secured party and the debtor
upon default, the section doing so added in a later subsection that the list of
those rights did “not purport to be exhaustive.”82 The next Official Text, promulgated in 1957, eliminated any mention of the non-exclusivity of the enumerated rights and made clear in an Official Comment that Part 5, which governed
76

U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2).
Id. § 9-609 cmt. 3. Colorado has provided examples of actions that breach the peace in its
enactment of Article 9. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-9-601(h) (West, Westlaw through 2021
Legis. Sess.) (stating that breach of the peace includes entering into a locked or unlocked
residence or residential garage; breaking, opening, or moving any lock, gate, or other barrier
to enter enclosed real property; or using or threatening to use violent means). For a detailed
discussion of actions that create a breach of the peace, see infra Section IV.A.
78 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(2).
79 See id. § 1-302(a) (permitting parties to vary the effect of the provisions of the UCC unless as otherwise provided). Although the UCC has embodied freedom of contract for most
of its life, that was not the case in the first draft of the act. Robert Braucher, The Legislative
History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 807 (1958). The provisions of the first version of the UCC were mandatory with the exception of rules that were
prefaced with “unless otherwise agreed.” Id. As a result, that first version attracted substantial negative commentary. See id. at 807–08 (explaining the origin of the UCC freedom of
contract principle).
80 U.C.C. § 9-601(a).
81 U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1952 Official Text) (enumerating the secured party’s rights upon the
debtor’s default); U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1957 Official Text) (stating that the secured party, upon the debtor’s default, has the rights provided by the part of Article 9 that governed default).
82 U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1952 Official Text).
77
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default, granted specific rights to the secured party but also placed limitations
on their exercise.83
The 1958 Official Text was the first version of Article 9 that authorized the
debtor and the secured party to define their rights by agreement. Both the text
and the Official Comment made clear that the existence of enumerated rights
and remedies in the default provisions of Article 9 did not preclude the parties
agreeing to additional rights and remedies in their loan documents.84 There is
little explanation, however, of the types of remedies and rights that might be
added by an agreement between the parties.
Commentary on the permission to add remedies by contract is scant. In the
early years of the UCC, commentators lauded the flexibility of Article 9 as
compared to its predecessor acts. The flexibility that the authors praised was in
the procedures for selling or otherwise realizing on collateral85 and in the expanded scope of security agreements,86 not in methods of obtaining collateral.
This is not surprising given that the bulk of the scholarship explaining Article 9
was produced between the 1950s and 1970s; the only way of interfering with
possession of collateral more than fifty years ago was to take manual possession of it. One author opined that the justification for allowing parties to define
remedies is that the effectiveness of the remedy will depend on the type of collateral; for example, a creditor needs the flexibility to both take possession of
physical goods in order to sell them and collect accounts in order to realize the
value of the accounts.87 Given that the text of the UCC provides distinct possession88 and collection89 remedies for goods and payment obligations respectively, that observation does not explain the permission to add remedies by
agreement. Another provided loan acceleration as an example of a right on
which the UCC is silent but that the parties can and universally do include in

83

U.C.C. § 9-501(1) cmt. 1 (1957 Official Text).
U.C.C. § 9-501(1) cmt. 1 (1958 Official Text).
85 See Hogan, supra note 75, at 220 (“In pursuit of its goal of flexibility, the Code substitutes for the more specific and rigid tests of the prior law a requirement that every aspect of a
disposition . . . must be ‘commercially reasonable.’ ”); William B. Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL.
U. L. REV. 265, 267–68 (1973) (explaining that Article 9 substitutes “flexibility in default
procedure . . . for the rigidity and complexity of default procedure under pre-Code chattel
security law”); Harold F. Birnbaum, Article 9—a Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 348, 385 (1952) (explaining that if the collateral is accounts, the secured party has the choice of selling them or collecting them, and if the collateral is bills of
lading, the secured party has the choice of selling either the documents or the goods covered
by the documents).
86 See Charles Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 59, 70, 71 & n.44 (1960) (explaining how the UCC enabled debtors
and creditors to agree to security agreements that extended to after-acquired property and
future advances).
87 See Davenport, supra note 85, at 268 (comparing the different methods of enforcement
for different types of collateral).
88 U.C.C. § 9-609(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
89 Id. § 9-607(a).
84
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their installment loan agreements.90 This second explanation sheds better light
on the permission to add remedies by contract and indicates that the drafters
intended to leave actions to enforce payment rights to contractual definition and
define and limit remedies against collateral by statute.
The case law on the parties’ ability to define additional remedies by
agreement is similarly thin. Some of the opinions address agreements that establish standards for a commercially reasonable sale of collateral, something
that the UCC permits parties to accomplish by agreement.91 Others address attempts to obtain waivers prohibited by Article 9.92 The ones that address the
creation of bespoke remedies involve parties’ attempts to provide a strict foreclosure remedy that avoids the necessity of complying with the UCC rules for
an effective strict foreclosure.93 One of the requirements for a strict foreclosure
is that the debtor agree after default to the creditor’s retention of collateral in
satisfaction of the debt.94 The opinions striking down parties’ attempts to define
an alternative to strict foreclosure that operates like strict foreclosure provide
evidence that if parties agree to a remedy that resembles an Article 9 remedy
without the Article 9 safeguards, such a remedy is impermissible.
Although the apparent permission to define remedies is consistent with the
general UCC policy of freedom of contract, it runs counter to the limits on that
freedom that pervade Article 9. This freedom has two important limits that restrict the ability of parties to contract out of Article 9’s rules. The first limit applies when a UCC provision affects the rights of third parties. Many Article 9
provisions affect third parties, for example perfection of a security interest in
90

See Fred H. Miller, Is Revision Due of U.C.C. Article 9, Part 5?, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 125,
128 (1991) (giving acceleration as an example of a remedy that is provided in installment
loan contracts); see also Redding v. Rowe, 678 P.2d 337, 338–39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)
(acknowledging that although the UCC is silent as to acceleration, parties may agree to it,
but their agreement will be strictly construed).
91 U.C.C. §§ 9-602(7), 9-603(a) (prohibiting parties from eliminating the requirement that a
sale of collateral be commercially reasonable but allowing them to define the standards by
which commercial reasonableness will be measured); see also Burns v. Anderson, 123 F.
App’x 543, 547–48 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that parties to a security agreement were permitted to define the standards by which a foreclosure sale of collateral consisting of corporate
stock would be commercially reasonable and citing to § 9-601(a) as authority).
92 See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Optima Servs. Int’l, Ltd., No. A-05-CA-394, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 144291, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2008) (observing that a debtor cannot waive its
rights to a surplus under Article 9, notwithstanding a clause in a security agreement that allows the creditor to sell the collateral and keep any surplus).
93 See, e.g., Forbes v. Four Queens Enters., Inc., 210 B.R. 905, 911 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding
that a pre-default agreement that provided that an escrowee would turn collateral over to the
secured party upon the debtor’s default was not effective to create a strict foreclosure); Emmons v. LeMaster, Inc., 10 P.3d 33, 35–36 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (striking down an attempted
strict foreclosure when the debtor and creditor agreed in their loan agreement that the creditor could exercise an “exclusive option to purchase” the collateral upon the debtor’s default);
Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan of Donald H. Bohne, 456 S.E.2d 237, 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that an agreement providing for a “full and complete assignment” of promissory
note collateral to the secured party upon the debtor’s default was “nothing more than an unenforceable attempt at pre-default waiver of the debtor’s rights”).
94 U.C.C. § 9-620(c).
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property gives a secured party priority over subsequent parties claiming an interest in the same property. As a result, parties cannot “otherwise agree” to the
rules regarding publication of a security interest.95 The other is the default context, in which the drafters of all versions of Article 9 recognized that defaulting
debtors are especially vulnerable to creditor overreach and thus should be limited in the matters to which they could freely agree.96
Article 9 codifies restrictions on freedom of contract in the remedies context. The seemingly broad authorization to fashion post-default rights in Section 9-601 is cabined by a list of restrictions in Section 9-602. That section prohibits parties from waiving several duties on the part of the secured party,
including the duty to notify the debtor before selling collateral in a foreclosure
sale and the duty to conduct the foreclosure sale in a commercially reasonable
manner.97 Although parties cannot waive or modify these duties, they can define the standards by which those duties are satisfied, so long as the standards
are not “manifestly unreasonable.”98 The reported opinions analyzing Section
9-602 address waivers and modifications of rights and obligations that are
enumerated in Article 9.99 The most stringent restriction relates to self-help repossession; the parties can neither eliminate the requirement that a repossession
be conducted in such a way that avoids breaching the peace nor define acts that
constitute breach of the peace in their agreement.100 It is this last restriction that
makes it unlikely that automated disablement is a permissible remedy in states
that have enacted the Official Text of the UCC.
The Official Text of the UCC presents several challenges to parties desiring to include remote disablement as a remedy in their loan agreements. Alt95

See Bunn, supra note 86, at 62–63.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-501 cmt. 4 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1972) (amended 2001)
(“In the area of rights after default our legal system has traditionally looked with suspicion
on agreements designed to cut down the debtor’s rights and free the secured party of his duties.”). The identical comment appears in the commentary to the 1958 Official Text, the first
version of Article 9 to allow parties to provide for remedies in their agreements. See also
Michael M. Greenfield, The Role of Assent in Article 2 and Article 9, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 289,
300 (1997) (explaining that Article 9 “is sensitive to problems of assent in connection with
the procedures on default”); Walker v. Grant Cnty. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 803 S.W.2d 913, 916
(Ark. 1991) (“[A] clear policy reason underlying Article 9 default provisions is the protection of post default debtors from the potential of overbearing tactics and intimidation by secured parties.”).
97 U.C.C. § 9-602.
98 Id. § 9-603(a).
99 See, e.g., In re Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc., 436 B.R. 582, 596–97 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2010) (holding that the attempted definitions of standards for a commercially reasonable sale
in the security agreement were manifestly unreasonable because the agreement defined
commercially reasonable sale as one for which specified notice was given, eliminating the
statutory requirements that such a sale be reasonable as to method, manner, time, place, and
other terms); In re Schwalb, 347 B.R. 726, 749–50 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (prohibiting a predefault waiver of the debtor’s right to object to a strict foreclosure).
100 U.C.C. § 9-603(b). There is scant literature on this section and thus little agreement on
the types of exculpatory clauses that will survive judicial scrutiny. See generally Michael
Korybut, The Uncertain Scope of Revised Article 9’s Statutory Prohibition of Exculpatory
Breach of Peace Clauses, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 271 (2014).
96
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hough parties could agree to remote disablement of equipment under Article 9
in that it is a method of rendering equipment unusable, it is not clear what disablement actions would breach the peace, and Article 9 prohibits parties from
defining breach of the peace in their agreements. It is difficult to argue that
agreeing to remote disablement of consumer goods is permissible. The UCC
does not appear to allow parties to design additional remedies against collateral,
and allowing parties to allow remote disablement of consumer goods as an additional remedy without requiring at least an ill-fitting breach of peace limitation to protect the debtor would have the counterintuitive consequence of
providing business debtors with better protections than consumer debtors. Although the UCC is not a consumer protection statute, most would consider that
to be a step too far.
B. Expanding the Concept of Possession to Include Disablement
It would be easy to avoid some of the problems described above by considering disablement to be a method of taking possession under Article 9. The
concept of possession has never been limited to the act of taking manual possession of an item.101 Courts have implied that “possession” for the purpose of
Article 9 remedies includes “constructive possession.”102 Expanding the meaning of possession to include disablement, however, would make some of the
language in Article 9 nonsensical. Repossession is also a trigger in the statutes
that govern consumer lending and allowing disablement to serve as the same
trigger would also make no sense.
Statutes specify that the act of taking possession triggers obligations on the
part of the secured party. For example, statutes have deadlines that run to or
from the time that a creditor takes possession of collateral. From a statutory interpretation perspective, remote disablement is not a repossession because the
triggers make no sense when an act of disablement does not transfer the physical possession of the collateral to the creditor.
C. Article 9 of the UCC
The first hurdle to characterizing automated disablement as a method of
taking possession is the language of Article 9 itself. Article 9 explicitly distin101

See FREDERICK POLLOCK & ROBERT SAMUEL WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN THE
COMMON LAW 13 (1888) (stating that any power to use and exclude others from an item will
suffice as possession and noting that whether an act will be sufficient to constitute possession will depend on the “nature of the thing dealt with, and the manner in which things of the
same kind are habitually used and enjoyed”).
102 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Douglas, 606 A.2d 684, 688 (Conn. 1992) (“In the absence of either
actual or constructive possession by the bank, [guarantor] cannot prevail on his claim that
the bank violated his rights under part 5 of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.”); see
also WM Cap. Partners, LLC v. Thornton, 525 S.W.3d 265, 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016)
(“[T]he requirement for a commercially reasonable disposition applies only once the secured
party has possession, either actual or constructive, of the collateral.”); infra notes 159–61
and accompanying text.
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guishes taking possession from disablement.103 If disablement is a method of
taking possession, the permission to render equipment unusable is redundant. In
addition, if Article 9 permits a creditor to take possession of collateral by disabling it, any distinction between consumer and business collateral in Section 9609(2) disappears.
Another hurdle is found in the duties that the UCC places on a creditor that
has taken possession of collateral. For example, Section 9-207 of the UCC requires a secured party to “use reasonable care in the custody and preservation
of collateral in [its] possession.”104 The same section allocates various expenses, risks, and duties incurred with respect to collateral in the possession of the
secured party between the secured party and the debtor.105 These sections do
not make sense in the disablement context; the hallmarks of possession in that
context are divided between the secured party, who has the ability to make the
collateral useless, and the debtor, who remains in control of the physical embodiment of the collateral. Although a disablement interferes with the debtor’s
right to possess collateral, it does not transfer manual possession of the collateral to the creditor.
For example, if a creditor, in a transaction governed by Article 9 of the
UCC, takes possession of collateral that is consumer goods, that creditor must
dispose of it and may not keep it in satisfaction of the obligation secured if the
debtor has paid 60 percent or more of the obligation secured.106 The statute requires that the secured party dispose of such collateral within ninety days of
taking possession unless the debtor has agreed otherwise.107 If a secured creditor has possession of collateral, it must use reasonable care in its custody or
preservation.108 In these provisions, Article 9 contemplates that the secured party has manual possession of the physical embodiment of the collateral.
D. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Laws
Automated repossession is used most often today in the automobile finance
industry. Lenders in that industry operate subject to motor vehicle sales finance
laws, which impose duties additional to those imposed by Article 9 of the UCC.
Under some of these laws, it is clear that repossession means only the physical
retaking of a vehicle. For example, such statutes require notice to the borrower
after repossession, and the notice must identify the location where the car is
stored.109 Some also require the notice to state that the car will be sold within a

103

U.C.C. § 9-609.
Id. § 9-207(a).
105 Id. § 9-207(b).
106 Id. § 9-620(e).
107 Id. § 9-620(f).
108 Id. § 9-207(a).
109 See, e.g., 12 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6254(a), (c)(4) (West 2014) (Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 12-624(d), 12601(k)(1) (West 2021) (Maryland statute applicable to all consumer loans secured by per104

22 NEV. L.J. 563

582

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2

stated period of time after repossession.110 In some states, a repossessing creditor must notify the local police department of the repossession.111 To require a
creditor to send such notices after a disablement is to force that creditor to
spend time and money complying with a nonsensical requirement (a debtor
whose car is disabled knows the location of that car) or face penalties for noncompliance.
E. Statutory Triggers and Non-Contact Repossessions
Courts have recognized the difficulty of expanding the statutory concept of
possession to include disablement. The opinion in Dawson v. J&B Detail, LLC
(In re Dawson)112illustrates why expanding current statutory definitions of possession to include disablement does not make sense. The debtor in Dawson
challenged his creditor’s use of a payment assurance device not only as a violation of the automatic stay, but as a violation of Ohio’s Retail Installment Sales
Act. That statute requires a secured party to give a debtor “specific notice to the
debtor after the secured party takes possession of collateral.”113 In rejecting this
complaint, the court observed that when the retail installment sales act used the
word possession, it meant only physical possession. This was clear from the
fact that the statute required the secured party to make the collateral available
for the debtor’s inspection and to “assemble the collateral and make it available
to the debtor at a time and place that is reasonably convenient to both parties.”114
In its opinion, the court made a distinction between a repossessing creditor
and a disabling creditor, noting that although the use of a shutoff device interferes with the owner’s use of a car, it does not deprive the owner of possession.115 The court observed that the statute in question clearly contemplates only “physical repossessions” because of requirements such as the requirement
that a secured party make collateral available “for inspection by the debtor during reasonable hours.”116
Because of these triggers, simply including disablement within repossession makes little sense. Yet disablement is a remedy against property, and it
dispossesses the owner of the use of that property. As such, disablement is a
remedy that belongs uniquely to a creditor with an interest in the debtor’s property; in other words, a secured creditor.

sonal property collateral with a value of less than $100,000). See generally NAT’L
CONSUMER L. CTR., REPOSSESSIONS § 6.5.2 (10th ed. 2022), www.nclc.org/library.
110 12 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6254(c)(3) (West 2014).
111 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255B, § 20C (2016).
112 See generally In re Dawson, No. 05-22369, 2006 WL 2372821, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
Aug. 15, 2006).
113 Id. at *13.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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F. Including Non-Contact Deprivations of Possession in the UCC
Although the primary self-help remedy in Article 9 is self-help repossession, the drafters who limited the self-help right recognized that a debtor’s possessory interest in collateral deserved protection from all types of interference.
The debtor, as owner of the collateral, has a property interest that allows it to
possess collateral free from interference by the secured party until default.117
The original drafters of the UCC made clear that a secured party had no right to
take possession of collateral from a debtor not in default, recognizing that any
exercise of physical control by the secured party can interfere with a debtor’s
day-to-day personal or business transactions.118 Although early secured transactions scholars and practitioners recognized that the act that warranted regulation
in secured credit statutes119 was the act of taking physical possession, the result
that warranted protection was the interference with the debtor’s use of the collateral. In the 1950s and 1960s, the only interference possible with respect to
tangible collateral involved physical interference; hence, they regulated the act
of taking physical possession. The acts that constitute possession have long
been dependent on the nature of the asset sought to be possessed and the manner in which it is “habitually used and enjoyed.”120 It is indisputable that deprivation of use is a property interest deserving of protection. In two cases, one
involving the Due Process Clause and the other involving the Fourteenth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court recognized that possession and
use are interests protected under the Constitution and that their deprivation,
even if temporary, was harmful.121
Article 9 recognizes that disablement is a remedy that should be governed
by Article 9 rules. The UCC has provided for a face-to-face disablement remedy against property used in a business since the first version of Article 9.122
That authorization has not changed in seven decades; today, as in the early
1950s, a secured party “without removal, may render equipment unusable and

117

See 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.3, at 1191
(1965) (“The debtor who remains in possession of personal property collateral is not, so long
as he avoids default, customarily disturbed in his use of the property.”). Security interests
that are perfected by possession are the exception to this rule; a debtor can agree with a secured party to give the secured party manual possession of collateral at the outset of a transaction. See U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (allowing a secured
party to perfect a security interest in tangible personal property by taking possession of that
property).
118 See GRANT, supra note 117 (“An automobile is meant to be driven; a machine is meant to
be used in making things; inventory is meant to be sold; receivables are meant to be collected.”).
119 The UCC rules governing repossession are substantively identical to the repossession
rules in predecessor statutes such as the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act. Id. § 43.6, at 1201.
120 See POLLOCK & WRIGHT, supra note 101, at 13.
121 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972); Sniadach v. Fam. Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
342 (1969).
122 See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1952 Official Text).
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dispose of collateral on a debtor’s premises.”123 In the 1950s, the only way to
disable equipment was to send a person in to do so. In that context, a breach of
the peace limitation makes sense.
Today, it is possible to deprive a debtor of possession of collateral in a way
that crosses the digital–physical divide. Article 9 does not yet account for the
fact that a remedy can cross that divide. Article 9 recognizes wholly intangible
collateral and has provisions for the collection of collateral consisting of payment rights upon a debtor’s default.124 That remedy is effected not by any type
of high-tech remote intervention, but by a letter or email message.125 After a
remote disablement, the debtor remains in possession of the physical asset.
Remote disablement causes different harms from those caused by “contact”
disablement, and any limitations on the use of remote disablement should be
geared towards minimizing those harms. In the next Part, I discuss how a handful of states have revised their secured credit statutes to account for the possibility of non-contact disablement by specifically allowing it as a creditor remedy and limiting it by standards appropriate to the harms caused by deprivations
of possession that cross the digital–physical divide.
III. STATUTORY RESPONSES TO AUTOMATED REPOSSESSION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been revised several times
since its original promulgation in the 1950s. Every significant revision in the
history of Article 9 responded to business practices that had evolved in a way
that stretched the then-existing law. The first version of Article 9 synthesized
the rules that had developed over the course of the prior decades to accommodate the demand for financing secured by a wide range of assets, both tangible
and intangible.126 The drafters of the last comprehensive revision, promulgated
in 1998, intended to take Article 9 into the digital age.127 Yet while the 1998
amendments facilitated electronic filing of financing statements,128 recognized
123

U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
Article 9 remains deficient, however, in providing for creditors’ remedies against intangible collateral that does not consist of payment rights. See generally Juliet M. Moringiello,
False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)relevance of (In)tangibility, 35 FLA. STATE U.
L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2007).
125 See U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(1) (allowing a secured party, after a debtor’s default, to “notify an
account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render
performance to or for the benefit of the secured party”).
126 See 1 GILMORE, supra note 117, § 9.1, at 288–89 (explaining that the demand to use all
types of personal property as security led to a fragmentation of personal property security
law and created a need for synthesis in what became Article 9 of the UCC).
127 See Jane Kaufman Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper Under Revised Article 9: Updating
the Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1055, 1055
(1999) (explaining the amendments intended to accommodate electronic contracts and electronic filing of financing statements).
128 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(70) (defining “record” as “information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form”); id. § 9-102(a)(39) (defining “financing statement” as “a record or records
composed of an initial financing statement and any filed record relating to the initial financ124
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electronic execution of documents,129 and anticipated some new types of intangible or electronic collateral,130 they did not anticipate electronic methods of
enforcing security interests. This omission is understandable; at the time the
amendments were being developed, electronic enforcement was most common
in software transactions, which were being addressed in another project: the Article 2B project that ended as the ill-fated Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, known as UCITA.131 At the time of the Article 9 revision, the
technology-related pressures on commercial law could all be traced to the
movement away from paper as a medium for negotiating and memorializing
commercial transactions.132
Several states have recognized in their statutes that creditors have the ability to disable collateral remotely. Some have done so by adding non-uniform
provisions to Article 9 of the UCC. Others have enacted laws aimed at curbing
abuses in consumer transactions and have placed their restrictions in statutes
governing unfair trade practices or motor vehicle sales.
A. Non-Uniform UCC Restrictions
The first state to place restrictions on remote disablement was Connecticut,
which did so in 2001 as a non-uniform amendment to the major Article 9
amendments that went into effect nationwide that year.133 The placement of
Connecticut’s electronic self-help provision and its cross-reference indicate that
the Connecticut legislature anticipated that creditors would use electronic selfhelp in both consumer and business transactions. The statute does that in a curious way, allowing a creditor to use electronic self-help to either take posses-

ing statement”); id. § 9-516(a) (defining filing as “communication of a record to a filing office”).
129 See id. § 9-102(a)(7) (defining “authenticate” as either “(A) to sign; or (B) with present
intent to adopt or accept a record, to attach or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol, or process”); id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (requiring authentication of a security
agreement as a prerequisite for attachment of a security interest).
130 See id. § 9-102(a)(31) (defining electronic chattel paper). See generally Winn, supra note
127 (discussing the electronic chattel paper provisions of the 1998 version of Article 9).
131 See infra notes 210–26 and accompanying text.
132 See Patricia Brumfield Fry, X Marks the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Concepts
for Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 607, 609–10 (1993) (explaining that the move
away from paper in commerce necessitated a reexamination of some of the “fundamental
structures of commercial law”).
133
S.B. 1226, 2001 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2001). At the same time, Connecticut
included electronic self-help provisions in its versions of Article 2A of the UCC and in its
enactment of the Uniform Consumer Leases Act. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-2A-702(e)
(2003) (recognizing electronic self-help as a method of taking possession after a lessee’s default under Article 2A); id. § 42-419(d)(1) (recognizing a lessor’s right to use electronic
means to disable leased goods under Connecticut’s Consumer Leases Act); see also Ralph J.
Rohner, Leasing Consumer Goods: The Spotlight Shifts to the Uniform Consumer Leases
Act, 35 CONN. L. REV. 647, 736 (2003) (explaining the origins of Connecticut’s electronic
self-help provision).
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sion of collateral or render equipment unusable.134 To take possession by electronic self-help could not have meant anything other than remote disablement
in 2001;135 even today, the idea that a car might drive itself to a lender remains
in the realm of science fiction.136
Connecticut’s curious wording expands the disablement remedy to consumer goods. A secured creditor may use electronic self-help to disable collateral only if the debtor agrees to such self-help in the security agreement.137 In a
consumer transaction, that agreement must be separate; in other words, merely
agreeing to a security agreement that includes an electronic self-help provision
does not constitute agreement to the use of electronic self-help in a consumer
transaction.138 The Connecticut statute requires the secured party to give notice
to the debtor before exercising electronic self-help.139
The Connecticut statute restricts the use of electronic self-help with a limitation that is tailored to the remote and automated nature of the remedy. The
one absolute restriction on the use of electronic self-help is that even if the secured party complies with all of the requirements of Connecticut’s statute, a secured party cannot use electronic self-help if the secured party “ . . . has reason
to know that its use will result in substantial injury or harm to the public health
or safety or grave harm to the public interest substantially affecting third parties
not involved in the dispute.”140
Colorado also regulates automated disablement in its version of Article 9.
Like Connecticut, Colorado enacted its non-uniform provision with the package
of amendments that became effective in 2001.141 There are significant differences, however, between Colorado’s restrictions on automated disablement and
those in Connecticut. Colorado’s rules governing the use of automated self-help
134

The statute defines “electronic self-help” as “the use of electronic means to exercise a
secured party’s rights under” the subsections addressing the use of self-help to take possession of collateral and disable collateral that can be described as equipment. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 42a-9-609(d) (2003).
135 In 1998, Julie Cohen used the analogy of “beam[ing]” a sofa out of an owner’s living
room to illustrate the harms inherent in the self-help disablement of software. Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1106 (comparing automated disablement to a “team of high-tech repo men” that had the ability to “ ‘beam’
your sofa out of your living room and back to the furniture store”).
136 See Andrew J. Hawkins, Tesla’s Smart Summon Feature Is Already Causing Chaos in
Parking Lots Across America, THE VERGE (Sept. 30, 2019, 12:22 PM), https://www.theverge
.com/2019/9/30/20891343/tesla-smart-summon-feature-videos-parking-accidents
[https://perma.cc/F86G-CBYG] (reporting on the problems caused by a Tesla feature that
purportedly enables a driver to cause her car to drive out of a parking spot to meet the driver).
137 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-609(d)(2) (2003).
138 Id.
139 Id. § 42a-9-609(d)(3).
140 Id. § 42a-9-609(d)(5). Connecticut’s language is identical to that in the 2000 draft of
UCITA. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L., Draft Amendments July 28–Aug. 4, 2000).
141 John L. McCabe & Arthur H. Travers, Introducing Revised Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 COLO. LAW. 9, 9 (2001).
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apply only when the collateral is equipment.142 The statute does not contain any
additional notice requirements, but like the Connecticut statute, Colorado’s
statute imposes restrictions on electronic self-help that are tailored to the nature
of the remedy. The statute prohibits a secured party from disabling or rendering
unusable any computer program or other similar device embedded in collateral
if immediate injury to any person or property is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such action.143 According to the scant commentary on the section,
it may have been intended to prevent disabling “the software that operates certain critical care equipment in hospitals and the like without the consent of the
debtor.”144 Both Colorado and Connecticut have therefore replaced the illfitting breach of the peace standard as a limitation on remote disablement with
one that recognizes the desirability of protecting the public from the harms that
are unique to remote disablement.
B. Restrictions Targeted at Subprime Auto Lending: Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Acts and Unfair Trade Practice Legislation
A handful of states target subprime automobile lending in their statutes
regulating the use of remote disablement. These restrictions are tailored to consumer lending and also to the harms that can result from the remote disablement of an individual’s vehicle.
California regulates the use of automated disablement in its Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act. The scope of California’s restrictions is narrow; its restrictions apply only to the automated shutoff of cars and, further, only to the
use of automated means of disablement by “buy here, pay here” automobile
dealers.145 The Act requires the dealer to give notice at the time the loan is
made that it will be using starter interrupt technology, and it requires the dealer
to give notice before it activates the technology.146 The California Act also requires the dealer to activate a deactivated car in the event of an emergency.147
Nevada passed starter interrupt legislation in 2017 and included it in its
laws regulating deceptive trade practices.148 Nevada’s statute is also limited to
motor vehicle financing and further limited to consumer transactions. Nevada’s
statute requires that the lender give actual notice to the borrower before it activates the starter interrupt device, prohibits disablement of a vehicle while it is
being operated, and provides for emergency operation.149 The statute specifies
that automated shutoff is a “constructive repossession” for the purposes of Ar142

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-9-609(a)(2) (West 2022) (“After default, a secured party . . . [w]ithout removal, may render equipment unusable . . . .” (emphasis added)).
143 Id. § 4-9-609(e).
144 McCabe & Travers, supra note 141, at 18.
145 A “buy here, pay here” dealer sells used cars and holds the majority of its loans as lender. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 241 (West 2021) (defining “buy-here, pay-here” dealers).
146 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2983.37 (West 2021).
147 Id.
148 NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.9715 (2017).
149 Id.
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ticles 2A and 9 of the UCC and Nevada’s law governing contracts for the installment sale of vehicles.150
New Jersey’s restrictions on electronic self-help are contained in its statutes governing unfair trade practices. New Jersey’s restrictions are also limited
to consumer motor vehicle financing, and they require robust notice of the use
of such a device, a grace period before activation, a warning prior to activation,
and the ability of the borrower to use the vehicle for a period of forty-eight
hours post-disablement.151 New Jersey’s statute makes clear that a vehicle cannot be disabled while in motion.152
New York’s provisions are placed in two different acts. The legislation
placed the definition of “payment assurance device” in the Uniform Commercial Code, yet it did not include that term anywhere in the UCC outside of the
definitional section.153 The remainder of the law is found in New York’s statute
regulating consumer debt collection and has very little in it other than specifying that notice of use of such a device be provided in the original security
agreement and that notice be given prior to its use.154 Although the New York
UCC does not include the use of payment assurance devices in its sections
dealing with repossession, the consumer debt collection law refers to payment
assurance devices as one method of effecting repossession.155
C. Sowing Confusion Through Untested Terminology and Stealth
Amendments to the UCC
In some of the statutes described above, the drafters attempted to fit a new
method of interfering with possession—disablement—into a known category of
doing so—manual interference. As explained in the last Section, that approach
sometimes leads to nonsensical results.156 Nevada and New York, in amending
their consumer laws, in fact appear to have amended the UCC to create a nonuniform act with respect to consumer transactions.
Nevada’s law, for example, uses a term that appears nowhere in the UCC:
“constructive repossession.” Yet the statute dictates that an automated disablement should be treated as a constructive repossession under the UCC.157 Not
only does the UCC not use the term constructive repossession, but courts have
also used the term very few times in opinions involving Article 9 remedies, and
authors writing about secured financing have used it even less frequently.158
In that last category is one author who used the term in discussing satellite
150

Id. § 598.9715(2)(c).
N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:8-206(5) (West 2021).
152 Id.
153 N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-102 (60-a) (McKinney 2018).
154 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 601(10) (McKinney 2018).
155 Id.
156 See supra notes 112, 115 and accompanying text.
157 NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.9715(2)(c) (2017).
158 See U.C.C. (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010); see also sources cited infra notes
159–61.
151
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financing. In her article, she uses “constructive repossession” to mean automated disablement, which is the only method by which a secured creditor can interfere with the possession of a satellite.159 When parties use the term “constructive repossession” in litigation under the UCC and consumer finance statutes,
they are usually arguing over whether actions taken by the secured creditor that
fall short of taking physical possession of collateral should trigger statutory duties, such as the duty to give the debtor notice, that arise when the secured party
takes possession of collateral.160 In such cases, courts find a repossession when
the secured party exercises dominion and control over the collateral.161
The statement in Nevada’s statute that remote disablement is a constructive
repossession raises several interpretative problems under the UCC. Nevada’s
statute importantly protects the safety of the debtor and members of the public
by prohibiting the automated shutoff of a moving car.162 It is not clear whether
characterizing automated shutoff as a constructive repossession for the purpose
of the UCC subjects it to the breach of peace limitation, given that the scant
case law on constructive repossession is limited to finding that such acts trigger
post-repossession duties on the part of the secured creditor.
New York’s law is muddy, but in a different way. The statute regulates a
lender’s use of a payment assurance device, as defined in the UCC, as a method
of effecting a repossession of a vehicle.163 Although the statute does not specify
that such an act is a repossession under the UCC, the UCC provides the foundational rules for repossession of all collateral, with consumer statutes providing
enhanced protection for individual debtors.164 If remote disablement is a repossession under New York law, then it is limited by the breach of peace standard,
which is not well suited to address the harms caused by the remote disablement,
or non-contact deprivation of possession, of physical collateral. The next Part
of this Article will explore the breach of peace standard in more detail to illustrate that it protects society’s interests that could be harmed by contact repos159

See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the
Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041, 1062 (2004) (describing constructive repossession as a method of taking the right to use and control a space asset).
160 See, e.g., Russell Nat’l Bank v. Smith, 556 A.2d 899, 900 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (dispute
over a mobile home that the debtors had surrendered to their lender); Van Wormer v. Charter
Oak Fed. Credit Union, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2246, *7–8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
2000) (automobile collateral had been in an accident and borrower did not have the car repaired because she was waiting for the lender’s instructions); Indus. Equip. Credit Corp. v.
Green, 467 N.E.2d 525, 526–27 (N.Y. 1984) (lender intended to sell collateral consisting of
movie theater seats while allowing the debtor to use the seats as it normally would).
161 Green, 467 N.E.2d at 527 (finding no constructive repossession where the collateral remained on the debtor’s premises and the debtor used the collateral as it did before the default); Russell Nat’l Bank, 556 A.2d at 901 (finding a constructive repossession when the
debtors surrendered the mobile home collateral to the lender, and the lender sent a letter to
the debtors notifying them that the mobile home had been repossessed).
162 NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.9715(2)(d)(1) (2017).
163 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 601(10) (McKinney 2018).
164 See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., REPOSSESSIONS § 2.3.2.1 (9th ed. 2017) (explaining that
state consumer credit law “almost always provides debtor protections beyond those found in
the UCC”).
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sessions of physical objects, but it is not well suited to serve as a standard by
which non-contact disablements of physical objects should be judged.
IV. WHAT WE PROTECT WHEN WE LIMIT SELF-HELP
The privilege to use self-help to recover property exists in few places outside of Article 9 of the UCC. One is in landlord-tenant law, although courts
have restricted or eliminated that right in many states.165 Yet another is in the
high-dollar, niche area of satellite financing. In the late 1990s, lawmaking bodies discussed providing a self-help remedy in software transactions,166 and although these attempts failed, the drafts of UCITA provide guidance on the types
of interests we might want to protect when the item interfered with is software.
Because a self-help remedy allows a wronged party to right the wrong
without resort to the courts, laws that provide self-help remedies place restrictions on their exercise. When the party exercising the self-help remedy violates those restrictions, the law forces that party to go to court to obtain redress.
As explained below, the restrictions on self-help remedies are designed to minimize the harm that can arise when a party takes the law into its own hands.
The interests protected by limitations on self-help vary according to the
self-help remedy at issue. This Part will explore limitations on self-help in several areas: Article 9 of the UCC, landlord-tenant law, software transactions, and
satellite financing.
A. Physical Interference with Possession I: Self-Help Repossession Under
Article 9 of the UCC
The UCC limits on the exercise of self-help to recover collateral are designed to minimize the harm that can occur in a contact interference with possession. The Article 9 rules assume that a repossession or disablement will involve a human who takes manual possession of or disables the collateral. Such
an interference might lead to a physical confrontation if the owner or a bystander witnesses the repossession. Because of this possibility, the secured party’s right to take possession of or disable collateral without legal process is limited by the duty not to breach the peace when doing so.167 This focus on
avoiding the harms of physical contact predates the UCC; a treatise on the law
of conditional sales before the UCC described the restriction on recapture as
one that prohibited acts that would “constitute a personal assault or a breach of
the peace.”168
The drafters of Article 9 intended flexibility in defining breach of the
165

See, e.g., Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978); Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and
the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69, 85 (2005) (explaining that the modern
trend is to force eviction into a judicial forum).
166 See infra notes 208–26 and accompanying text.
167 U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
168 3 LEONARD A. JONES, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES 424
(6th ed. 1933) (emphasis added).
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peace. The Official Text of the UCC gives no guidance as to what acts constitute a breach of the peace,169 and the Official Comment to Section 9-609 expresses the drafters’ desire that the identification of conduct that causes a
breach of the peace be left to “continuing development by the courts.”170 To reinforce the drafters’ intention that only courts may develop standards for determining when a breach of the peace occurs, the UCC prohibits parties from
defining breach of peace in their contracts.171
Broad policy statements about the interests that the breach of peace standard protects influence the courts in developing guidelines for holding that a repossessor’s actions caused a breach of the peace. These policies include “society’s interest in tranquility”172 and reduction of “the risk to the public associated
with extrajudicial conflict resolution.”173 To implement these policies, courts
have established their own spectra of acts that might constitute a breach of the
peace. For example, physical violence, whether instigated by the debtor or
creditor, will be a breach of the peace.174 Some courts describe actions that
“breach the peace” as actions that disturb public order.175 On the other end of
that spectrum, there is no breach of the peace when a creditor “peaceably persuades” the debtor to give up the collateral.176 One court set forth a catalogue of
actions that could be classified as breaching the peace, listing “the use of law
enforcement, violence or threats of violence, trespass, verbal confrontation, and
disturbance to third parties.”177
Courts agree unanimously that the entry into a debtor’s home without contemporaneous consent of the debtor results in a breach of the peace. Such an act
will always constitute a breach of the peace even if no one is home to witness
the repossession because the chance that a returning homeowner will resort to
violence upon finding a repossessor in his home is just too great.178 Because an

169

Colorado’s version of the UCC provides a non-exclusive list of actions that constitute a
breach of the peace, including entering a locked or unlocked residence; breaking, opening, or
moving a lock or barrier to enter any enclosed real property; and using or threatening to use
violent means. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-9-601(h) (West 2006).
170 U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3.
171 Id. § 9-603(b); see also supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
172 See Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colo. Cent. Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 473 (Wyo.
1990).
173 Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171, 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
174 See Ivy v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 612 So. 2d 1108, 1112 (Miss. 1992) (explaining that a secured party’s privilege to use self-help to repossess collateral will end “if repossession evokes physical violence, either on the part of the debtor or the secured party”).
175 See Madden v. Deere Credit Servs., Inc., 598 So. 2d 860, 865 (Ala. 1992) (adding that
the violation of “any law enacted to preserve peace and good order” is likewise considered a
breach of the peace).
176 Ivy, 612 So. 2d at 1112.
177 Rivera v. Dealer Funding, LLC, 178 F. Supp. 3d 272, 279 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
178 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26–7 (6th
ed. 2010); Braucher, supra note 13, at 572 (setting forth a typology of breach of the peace
cases).
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individual has the right to resort to violence to protect his home,179 courts recognize that an entry into a home “has a tendency to excite a breach of the peace
and invite violent resistance.”180 One court opining on a repossession under a
conditional sale contract ruled that an entry into a home was impermissible because it “constituted a gross outrage on the rights and feelings of [the debtor], . . . for which courts of justice must either grant redress or sanction the personal exaction of satisfaction by violence.”181
An entry into a home carries with it a great potential for violence. That potential is less when the repossession is from terrain surrounding the residence.
Many courts have had the opportunity to opine on repossessions from residential driveways and tend to conclude that a repossession without force or confrontation from a private residential driveway does not breach the peace.182 In
opining on a repossession from a ranch that contained a residence, one court
observed that the potential for violence increases as the distance between the
repossession and the dwelling decreases.183 In that case, the court focused also
on privacy expectations; finding no other opinions addressing a repossession
from a large rural property, the court questioned whether rural privacy expectations were sufficiently unique to rule that an uncontested repossession from a
secluded area next to the residence was a breach of the peace.184
Determining whether entry into business premises breaches the peace is a
more complicated task. Courts are unanimous in holding that a trespass, without more, is not a breach of the peace.185 A secured party, having been granted
by law a right to obtain possession of collateral, has a privilege to enter land, so
long as it does so “at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.”186 Such a
reasonable manner precludes the use of force.187 Yet when collateral is kept in
an enclosed space, a repossession from that space risks breaching the peace, es-

179

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 87(2) (AM. L. INST. 1934); see also Richard A. Posner, Killing
or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201, 205 (1971) (explaining
that the Restatement authorizes the use of deadly force to “prevent wrongful dispossession
from the user’s dwelling place, even if the dispossession involves no danger of physical
harm”).
180 Girard v. Anderson, 257 N.W. 400, 402 (Iowa 1934).
181 Van Wren v. Flynn, 34 La. Ann. 1158, 1159 (La. 1882).
182 See Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Mississippi law and relying on pre-UCC authority that held that such a repossession did not invade
the privacy of the debtor’s home); Ivy v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 612 So. 2d 1108,
1111 (Miss. 1992) (stating that repossession from a private driveway without the use of force
does not breach the peace).
183 See Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colo. Cent. Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 474 (Wyo.
1990).
184 See id. at 475.
185 See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (listing
cases).
186 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 183(1) (AM. L. INST. 1965); see also Braucher, supra note 13, at 604–11 (discussing cases that apply Restatement rules in resolving repossession disputes).
187 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 183 cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 1965).
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pecially if the repossessor must break or destroy a barrier.188 For example, in
ruling that a creditor that gained access to the debtor’s business premises by
breaking a lock breached the peace, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that
breaking and entering any premises, whether residential or business, is “a serious act detrimental to any concept of orderly conduct of human affairs and a
breach of the peaceful solution to a dispute.”189
When the dispute does not involve an entry into or onto real estate, some
courts hold that “violence, or at least some threat of violence” is necessary for a
court to find that a repossession breached the peace.190 A simple exhortation
not to take the collateral is not a threat of violence.191 According to one court,
holding an “unequivocal oral protest,” without more, to be a breach of the
peace would “render the self-help repossession statute useless.”192 Many courts
hold the opposite, however, finding that a repossession over a debtor’s oral objection is likely to lead to violence and is therefore a breach of the peace.193
Protected interests other than the interest in being free from violence come
into play in two scenarios: repossessions in which law enforcement officers are
involved without a court order authorizing their involvement and repossessions
involving trickery. Some courts hold that there is a breach of the peace when
the creditor brings a law enforcement officer along to help with the repossession. In these cases, the officers are not acting in their official capacity pursuant
to a court order.194 This action would not appear to be a breach of the peace in
the traditional sense; the presence of law enforcement personnel should avoid
violence. In one case in which the creditor enlisted the aid of law enforcement
because the repossession was to take place in a neighborhood located next to a
housing project, the court held that a creditor “cannot use the power of the state
to prevent a breach of the peace from occurring . . . . If law enforcement is
needed, then a breach of the peace has occurred, and the creditor must secure
judicial intervention to carry out the repossession.”195 The court added that the
188

See Koontz, 661 N.E.2d at 1175; Laurel Coal Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 539 F.
Supp. 1006, 1007 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that a repossessor who cut a chain that locked a
fence enclosing the collateral breached the peace).
189 Riley State Bank v. Spillman, 750 P.2d 1024, 1030 (Kan. 1988). The creditor in that case
did not leave the premises unlocked; it replaced the locks after breaking them. Id. at 1026.
190 See Harris Truck & Trailer Sales v. Foote, 436 S.W.2d 460, 463–64 (Tenn. App. 1968)
(holding that the term “breach of the peace” as used in Article 9 “should be construed according to the ordinary and usual meaning of the words there used” and rejecting the trial
judge’s charge to the jury that violence or a threat of violence was not necessary to determine that a breach of the peace had occurred).
191 See Koontz, 661 N.E.2d at 1174 (holding that the debtor’s screams of “don’t take it”
would not lead a reasonable repossessor to conclude that violence was imminent).
192 Id.
193 See generally NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 164, § 6.4.4 (listing opinions on both
sides).
194 One case described the officers’ role as “civil standby,” under which a private party pays
police officers to “assist in matters such as preventing violence at the scene of a domestic
quarrel, directing traffic at a highway construction project, or escorting a wideload truck.” In
re MacLeod, 118 B.R. 1, 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990).
195 Albertorio-Santiago v. Reliable Fin. Servs., 612 F. Supp. 2d 159, 170 (D.P.R. 2009).
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presence of a law enforcement officer chills the “legitimate exercise” of the defaulting debtor’s right to object to the repossession.196
Although most courts permit a secured creditor or its agent to trick a debtor
into giving up possession of collateral, others place trickery into the breach of
peace category. Courts in the former category do not view misrepresentations
about the repossessor’s right to take collateral as actions that provoke violence.197 Those in the latter category draw only a tenuous connection between
trickery and violence, condemning trickery not because it causes violence but
because allowing repossession by trick would “encourage practices abhorrent
to society: fraud, trickery, chicanery, and subterfuge, as alternatives to employment of judicial processes that foster the concept of ours being a government of laws and not of men.”198
In reviewing the breach of peace cases, protection against violence emerges as a key goal. Violence is the potential undesirable result of a contact repossession or disablement, so it is logical that the interest that the law protects
when the law restricts the use of repossession or disablement in the purely
physical realm is the interest of being free from violent confrontation. Yet in
many reported opinions under the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, and the common law preceding that Act, courts have
found breach of the peace in actions that had little chance of disturbing public
order.199 Some courts appear to value friction in the repossession process by
recognizing a right to object to repossession. Others protect debtors against
practices that society abhors. The next Section will address another type of
physical interference with possession: eviction from real property.
B. Physical Interference with Possession II: Self-Help Evictions Under
Landlord-Tenant Law
Repossession of personal property has an analog in the world of real property: eviction. Like personal property repossession, eviction traditionally takes
place in a purely physical realm. Due to the likelihood of violence that accompanies the interference with an individual’s home, the difficulty inherent in defining “peaceable self-help,” and the availability in many jurisdictions of summary eviction proceedings, 200 the majority of states have prohibited self-help

196

Id.
See K.B. Oil Co. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 811 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding no
likelihood of violence when the creditor’s agent misrepresented to the owner of premises on
which the collateral was located that he had permission to take the collateral).
198 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Byrd, 351 So. 2d 557, 559 (Ala. 1977).
199 See supra, text accompanying notes 194–98.
200 Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3
(2012) (identifying the availability of summary eviction proceedings as a factor in the elimination of self-help remedies in residential leases). The Restatement (Second) of Property
takes the position that the availability of such proceedings makes self-help unnecessary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 14.3 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
197
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eviction with respect to residential leases.201
When self-help eviction is allowed, it is limited by the requirement that it
be done without a breach of the peace. Landlords in many jurisdictions are
permitted to evict commercial tenants without resort to judicial process, but only if that eviction can be done peaceably.202 The restrictions on self-help evictions anticipate the possibility of contact.203 As a result, actions that could produce violence are prohibited. To determine whether an entry is peaceable,
courts apply the same standards as they do in UCC cases; in other words, the
entry must be accomplished in a manner that avoids violence.204
Eviction law recognizes that landlords can deny tenants possession by
methods designed to avoid physical contact with the tenant. As a result, acts
such as padlocking the premises and terminating utilities have been limited by
statute or by judicial decision.205 The termination of utilities is an example of
an eviction that crosses the digital–physical divide, and eviction law recognizes
the equivalence of physical intrusions that result in a deprivation of use of
physical space and remote interventions that have the same result. The Revised
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which prohibits the use of selfhelp by a landlord to retake leased premises,206 similarly prohibits a landlord
from discontinuing an essential service to the property.207 Because the prohibition is absolute, there is no analysis of whether a utility shutoff breaches the
peace. Possession of a dwelling is the protected interest, and the law protects
against both the physical and remote deprivations of that possession.

201

See DALE A. WHITMAN ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.79 (4th ed. 2019) (explaining
that “the substantial majority of American jurisdictions” have abolished self-help evictions
in residential leases either by statute or by judicial decision); Mary B. Spector, Tenants’
Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L.
REV. 135, 155–56 (2000) (describing the move away from allowing self-help evictions from
dwellings).
202 See, e.g., Donegal Assocs., LLC v. Christie-Scott, LLC, 241 A.3d 1011, 1025 (Md. App.
Ct. 2020) (“[A] commercial landlord is permitted, although it is not encouraged, to resort to
self-help to repossess premises.”); see also Watson v. Brown, 686 P.2d 12, 16 (Haw. 1984)
(allowing self-help evictions in commercial leases in Hawaii). But see Turks Head Realty Tr.
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 422, 428 (D.R.I. 1990) (explaining Rhode
Island’s prohibition of self-help in all leases, residential and commercial).
203 For example, the Restatement (Second) of Property protects against two categories of
harm in its restrictions on self-help evictions. The first is physical harm to individuals, and
the second is harm to the tenant’s property located on the leased premises. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 14.2 cmt. A (AM. L. INST. 1977).
204 See generally Rucker v. Wynn, 441 S.E.2d 417, 420 (Ga. App. Ct. 1994) (citing to UCC
cases for the standards by which a breach of the peace is determined).
205 James DePriest, Self-Help Evictions, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 798, 802 (1991); see, e.g.,
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.008(a) (West 2013) (prohibiting a landlord from terminating
utilities to a tenant because of a lease default); see also id. § 92.0081(b) (restricting a landlord’s ability to exclude a tenant from residential premises without judicial process for failure to pay rent).
206 UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 604 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE L. 2015).
207 Id. § 605.
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C. Digital Deprivations of Digital Assets: Self-Help Disabling of Software
At the same time that subprime auto lenders were introducing primitive
electronic means to disable physical collateral, debates were raging over the use
of remote controls to disable software. In the 1990s, the Uniform Law Commission and American Law Institute embarked on major amendments to Articles 2 and 9 of the UCC.208 As part of the effort, the sponsoring bodies proposed an Article 2B of the UCC to govern computer information
transactions.209 After several years of controversy, the ALI withdrew from the
project, and the ULC promulgated it as the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, or UCITA.210 The Act was a failure, enacted by only two
states: Maryland and Virginia.211 Concerns about electronic self-help remedies
proliferated during the UCITA debates. Although UCITA was a failure, it provides some lessons about what interests the law might protect when it allows
electronic interference with property rights.
UCITA attempted to provide a contracting framework for computer information, which was different from other contract subjects in several significant
ways. One was that a computer information contract could be both formed and
performed electronically.212 Another was that the customary method of transferring rights in software is by a license that defines the parameters of the licensee’s use. In effect, the license, rather than any physical manifestation, defines
the product.213 Another key factor that distinguishes software from other products is that it can be copied and transferred on a wide scale.214 For these reasons, software licensors wanted a statute that would bless technological controls over software licensees.
One of the many objections to UCITA was its prematurity. In the late
1990s, software transactions were fairly new, and there was not a lot of settled
common law on which a statute could be based.215 The specter of electronic
208

Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. COMPUT. & INFO. L.
547, 547 (1999).
209 Id. at 547–48.
210 Id.
211 Computer Information Transactions Act Enactment Map, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=92b2978d585f-4ab6-b8a1-53860fbb43b5 [https://perma.cc/KKZ3-VYGX].
212 Mary Jo Howard Dively, The New Laws That Will Enable Electronic Contracting: A
Survey of the Electronic Contracting Rules in the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 209, 225 (2000).
213 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 635, 648
(1999) (explaining that computer information is “not defined physically, but rather by the
bundle of rights granted under the license”).
214 Nim Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643, 648
(2003).
215 See O’Rourke, supra note 213, at 651 (explaining that the customs in software contracting in the later 1990s were rapidly evolving and that as a result it was not appropriate to defer to particular norms at that time); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and Contract
Law for the Information Age: Foreword to a Symposium, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1999) (ob-
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disablement raised the possibility of impairing the security of computer systems
and destroying other programs and data on the host computer.216 These novel
harms were different from the known harms inherent in contact interferences
with physical assets and thus required new types of protection. The internet
created rights that merited protection from remote interference, but at the turn
of the twenty-first century, the legal world was only beginning to sort out how
those rights would be protected. The rich literature discussing electronic intrusions into computer systems and the application of the tort of trespass to chattels to those intrusions217 illustrates the challenges in identifying purely digital
harms and the remedies for those harms.
Another fatal objection to UCITA was its poor harmonization of intellectual property and commercial law. UCITA was about transactions in information,
and intellectual property law governs many aspects of information transactions.218 UCITA’s graft of commercial law’s freedom of contract principles onto transactions that are subject to federal law and policy subjected UCITA to
the well-deserved scorn of intellectual property experts.219
In its various iterations, the Act that started life as Article 2B and ended as
UCITA delivered two sections that allowed technological controls over contractual obligations. It permitted licensors to regulate performance electronically by including restraints in software code to enforce a contract term.220 This
provision drew the ire of intellectual property experts who argued that such restraints violated rights, such as fair use, that were granted to licensees by federal law.221 Early drafts of UCITA also permitted a licensor to disable software
upon the licensee’s breach of contract.222 That section was one of the most reviled provisions of the Act and was deleted from the final promulgated version.223 Yet the automated disablement provision that was deleted from UCITA
serving that the act then known as Article 2B “would apply not only to commerce occurring
in mature markets, but also to forms of electronic commerce that are immature, emerging, or
yet to be developed”).
216 See Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 111 (2011) (explaining some of the possible harms that can come
from electronic disablement of software).
217 See, e.g., Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 23 n.2, 24 & n.4
(2007) (providing a catalog of articles in which authors advocated for a “right to exclude
others from connected resources” and articles whose authors were skeptical of such a right);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 677, 678 (2009) (noting the re-emergence of trespass to chattels “in a new guise, as a
sword against electronic intrusions over the Internet”).
218 Samuelson, supra note 215, at 4.
219 See Charles McManis, The Privatization (or “Shrink-Wrapping”) of American Copyright
Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 176 (explaining how proposed Article 2B would have permitted
the interference with fair use rights granted by federal copyright law).
220 Cohen, supra note 135, at 1096–97.
221 See, e.g., McManis, supra note 219, at 176.
222 Cohen, supra note 135, at 1100.
223 As ultimately promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission, UCITA prohibited electronic self-help entirely. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 816 (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2002). Nevertheless, only two states, Maryland and Virginia,
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is useful because it illustrates what interests the law might protect when it allows a system to be disabled remotely. The last draft that permitted electronic
self-help did so only if a list of conditions was satisfied. The draft required the
licensee to separately assent to electronic disablement and required the licensor
to give fifteen days’ notice before exercising electronic disablement.224 Even if
those conditions were satisfied, the draft prohibited electronic disablement if
the licensor had “reason to know that its use will result in substantial injury or
harm to the public health or safety or grave harm to the public interest substantially affecting third persons not involved in the dispute.”225 Moreover, the draft
prohibited self-help electronic disablement in all “mass market transactions,”
which the Act defined as all consumer licenses as well as all licenses that were
offered to the general public on standard forms.226
After UCITA failed, the American Law Institute took another bite of the
remote disablement of software apple in its Principles of the Law of Software
Contracts. Unlike UCITA, the Principles allow automated disablement of software, but prohibit it in mass-market and consumer transactions.227 Acknowledging that self-help automated disablement was one of the most controversial
topics in the UCITA drafting process, however, the Principles prohibit automated disablement without a court order.228 In addition, the Principles require
that the software vendor provide notice of its intention to disable the software,
again acknowledging a unique feature of software disablement—if one software program is disabled, there is a chance that other data on the computer, unrelated to the software, will be harmed. Notice gives the owner the opportunity
to take steps to alleviate the potential harm.229
The practice of disabling physical collateral and the practice of disabling
software share characteristics but are distinguishable in an important way.
When a creditor disables physical collateral remotely, it is reaching through the
digital–physical divide to infringe upon a recognized property right—
possession—that debtor-creditor law protects in a detailed way.
D. Remedies that Cross the Digital–Physical Divide: Self-Help Remedies in
Satellite Financing
This Article presented, as an example of disablements that cross the digital–physical divide, the relatively low-dollar, non-negotiated world of subprime
automobile financing. Remote disablement also plays a role on the other end of
the financing spectrum in the sophisticated, high-dollar world of satellite fienacted the law. See Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act Enactment Map, supra
note 211.
224 UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 816 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L., Draft Amendments July 28–Aug. 4, 2000).
225 Id.
226 Id. § 102.
227 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 4.03 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010).
228 Id.
229 Id.
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nancing. The limits on disabling space assets provide another example of the
interests that the law protects when it limits self-help creditor remedies. In the
1990s, the satellite business shifted from one comprised of solely public providers to one comprised of a mix of public and private providers.230 This shift
led to a demand for secured financing of satellites. Because it is undesirable
and almost impossible to physically repossess a satellite and bring it back to
Earth,231 secured creditors desire to seize control of their satellite collateral.232
To accommodate this demand for financing secured by satellites and other
space assets, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, more
commonly known as UNIDROIT, drafted a Space Protocol to its Convention
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment.233 In fashioning creditor remedies against space asset collateral, the drafters faced two tasks. The first was to
protect a creditor’s interest in a satellite in the event of non-payment. The second was to place limits on the creditor’s ability to exercise those remedies in a
way tailored to the harms that the remedy could produce.
The Convention and Space Protocol permit a creditor to take control of a
space asset upon the debtor’s default.234 The Space Protocol recognizes that in
order to take control, a creditor must have the codes and data to enable such
control and allows parties to a security agreement to agree to an escrow arrangement for such codes.235
Providing for control is the easy part, and the existence of the control remedy in the Cape Town Convention is useful to illustrate that law-making bodies
have recognized that control of a tangible asset is a remedy that is available only to secured creditors. The repossession, disabling, or transfer of control of a
satellite could have serious repercussions on the ground, however, and the
Space Protocol attempts to mitigate those effects by its public service provisions. Satellites are used to provide telecommunications and air navigation services, and the disruption, even for a short time, of either of these could have se-

230

See Paul B. Larsen & Juergen A. Heilbock, UNIDROIT Project on Security Interests:
How the Project Affects Space Objects, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 703, 705–06 (1999); Zhao Yun,
Revisiting Selected Issues in the Draft Protocol to the Cape Town Convention on Matters
Specific to Space Assets, 76 J. AIR L. & COM. 805, 806 (2011) (explaining trends in space
commercialization).
231 Yun, supra note 230, at 817–19 (explaining that technology current at the time would not
have allowed for physical retrieval of satellites and that bringing a satellite back to Earth
would destroy the value of the satellite).
232 See Larsen & Heilbock, supra note 230, at 707 (describing the secured creditors’ interests in regulating the financing of space assets).
233 For the text of the Space Protocol, see Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets, Mar. 9, 2012, UNIDROIT
[hereinafter Space Protocol]. For the text of the Convention, see Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, UNIDROIT [hereinafter Cape Town Convention].
234 See Cape Town Convention, supra note 233, at art. 8 § 1(a) (permitting a secured creditor to take possession or control of collateral after a debtor’s default).
235 See Space Protocol, supra note 233, at art. XIX.
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vere and dangerous consequences.236 Recognizing this, the Space Protocol limits a creditor’s remedies when a satellite is used to provide public services. Pursuant to the Space Protocol’s public service provision, a country or a public
services provider within that country can file a public service notice in the International Registry, notifying all relevant parties that the space asset is used to
provide a public service.237 If such a notice is filed with respect to a satellite, a
creditor may not exercise its remedies in such a way that would make the satellite unable to provide that service.238
In limiting self-help remedies against property, the law recognizes the
harms inherent in the remedy and incorporates protections appropriate to the
remedy. In the next Part, this Article will discuss considerations in fashioning
appropriate limits around remote disablement of personal property collateral.
V. PROTECTED INTERESTS WHEN ACTIONS CROSS THE DIGITAL–PHYSICAL
DIVIDE
As explained above, the most important limit on self-help repossession in
the UCC is the proscription against it if exercising self-help will cause a breach
of the peace. Flexibility is a hallmark of the UCC by design; the original drafters designed a code that would allow courts to adjust the law to respond to the
evolution of commercial practices.239 This flexibility is prominent in Article 9’s
default provisions, which leave the definition of “breach of the peace” up to the
courts. In opinions analyzing breach of the peace, courts find a breach of the
peace when the creditor’s actions create a possibility of violence and physical
confrontation.240 But there is a limit to the flexibility of the breach of the peace
standard—although it can be stretched to encompass the panoply of harms
caused by a contact deprivation of possession, non-contact deprivations stretch
the standard to its breaking point.
In permitting creditors to use self-help to remotely disable collateral, the
UCC should restrict its use by a standard tailored to the harm that self-help remote disablement can cause. The UCC limits contact self-help repossessions by
a breach of the peace standard because it has been long recognized that “the
preservation of the public peace is of more importance to society than the right
of the owner of a chattel to get possession of it.”241 Although proponents of remote disablement claim that such dispossessions avoid the possibility of physical confrontation and thus cannot breach the peace,242 automated disablement
harms other interests that the law should protect.
Remote disablement allows a creditor to gain control over property that it
236

See Yun, supra note 230, at 819.
See Space Protocol, supra note 233, at art. XXVI.
238 See id. at art. XXVI, cl. 3.
239 Braucher, supra note 13, at 549–50, 568.
240 See supra Section IV.A.
241 Williams v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 502 (1909).
242 See Hudson & Laudicina, supra note 18, at 845 (“[T]here appears to be scarce opportunity to breach the peace when a vehicle’s starter is disabled because of a payment default.”).
237
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would not otherwise be able to reach if the creditor had been required to proceed physically. For example, a physical entry into a home is always a breach
of the peace,243 and thus, a creditor cannot reach items typically kept in a home
without bringing an action for replevin. Courts also find that breaking into
locked business premises results in a breach of the peace.244 By using remote
disablement, a creditor could more easily shut down a business or deprive an
individual of an important household good such as life-sustaining medications
kept in a smart refrigerator (or even a car kept in an attached garage).
Here, the lessons from the UCITA debates can be useful. In critiquing the
UCITA automated disablement provisions, several authors identified other interests that could be harmed in self-help software disablement. For example,
although a remote deactivation of software would likely not lead to physical
violence, it could harm a software licensee’s property interests in digital files,
other software, and its business.245 Such a deactivation might also violate privacy norms in that although remote disablement avoids physical violence, it is
nonetheless invasive from the user’s perspective.246
States that have borrowed from UCITA in revising their versions of the
UCC to recognize and regulate remote disablement make safety the paramount
protected interest. As a result, in Colorado and Connecticut, a creditor cannot
use remote means to disable collateral if doing so would put the safety or health
of the public at risk.247 Safety is also a motivating factor in the limits that the
subprime auto financing industry has imposed on itself in using remote means
to disable vehicles. According to the industry’s standards and the contracts used
by subprime automobile lenders, a lender shall not disable a moving vehicle.248
Safety plays a role on the other end of the loan size spectrum, with satellite disablements prohibited if they would deprive the public of an essential service.249
The Article 9 self-help restriction often goes beyond the prevention of violence. Some courts have noted friction as a protected interest, finding that the
involvement of law enforcement officers in a repossession that is being conducted privately by a creditor breaches the peace.250 Such a repossession, designed to avoid violence, is nonetheless considered to breach the peace because
it deprives the debtor of its right to object to the repossession.251 As enforcement of security interests and other rights becomes more automated, parties
243

See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Riley State Bank v. Spillman, 750 P.2d 1024, 1030 (Kan. 1988).
245 Stephen L. Poe & Teresa L. Conover, Pulling the Plug: The Use and Legality of Technology-Based Remedies by Vendors in Software Contracts, 56 ALB. L. REV. 609, 624 (1993).
246 See Cohen, supra note 135, at 1105 (comparing automated disablement to “a team of
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247 See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
248 See supra Section I.A.
249 See supra Section IV.D.
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2009).
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will be deprived of the opportunity to apply flexibility in enforcing those
rights.252 As a result, borrowers may suffer asset losses that could otherwise
have been prevented.253
The preservation of friction plays a role in some of the laws that have restricted automated shutoff. Some of these statutes require the creditor to notify
the debtor of the possibility of remote disablement in the loan agreement and
again after default but before exercising disablement.254 Article 9 does not require the creditor to give notice before exercising its right of self-help repossession, but a debtor has the ability to prevent the repossession by negotiating or
acting in a way that might cause a breach of the peace. The lack of a notice requirement, combined with the proscription on breach of the peace, protects the
interests of the creditor, the debtor, and the public. A creditor can move without
notice, thus protecting its right to obtain the collateral free from the possibility
that the debtor will hide the collateral. The debtor is protected in theory because
if the debtor is present, the debtor or its agent can take some action to stall the
repossession. If the repossession breaches the peace, then it stops. Requiring
notice before disablement preserves this friction.
One court held that a repossession effectuated by breaking and changing
the locks to the debtor’s business breached the peace because breaking and entering is “detrimental to any concept of orderly conduct of human affairs and a
breach of the peaceful solution to a dispute.”255 This raises a question as to
whether the concepts of “orderly conduct of human affairs” have evolved to
adapt to an environment in which goods are connected in such a way that they
can be shut off remotely. There is a rich literature addressing how interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment has evolved from the era in which “search” meant
ruffling through papers256 to an era in which a person’s goods include not only
physical objects but the data and signals emanating from those objects.257 That
literature could be informative in thinking about how the expectations protected
by Article 9’s breach of the peace standard may change as tangible personal
252

See Danielle D’Onfro, Smart Contracts and the Illusion of Automated Enforcement, 61
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173, 181–82 (2020) (explaining that both businesses and consumers
desire some flexibility in enforcement). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Chicago v. Fulton illustrates how the removal of friction can increase costs and inconvenience
in bankruptcy cases. See City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 590, 592 (2021) (holding
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253 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2273 (2008) (explaining that the
number of completed home foreclosure sales is smaller than the number of foreclosure actions filed, in part because of the “property-retentive features” of foreclosure law).
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and accompanying text.
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(2010).
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property changes.
It is difficult to anticipate some of the dangers that may arise from remote
disablement. Remote disablement does not take place in the same physical environment, but any time that a person is deprived of her use of an item that she
owns without any court review, there is the possibility of an emotionally
charged atmosphere.258 As goods are combined with software and machine
learning capabilities, individuals might be tempted to attack the product itself if
it is turned off unexpectedly.259 Although it might seem like a silly fantasy to
protect the item itself from harm, at least two authors have discussed the implications of technology-fueled integration of both physical items and commercially valuable information with human bodies.260 As items become more connected to humans in a digital and physical sense, protection of the human may
come to the fore in restricting remote disablement of items.
CONCLUSION
The UCC was designed to allow and facilitate the expansion of commercial
practices. Article 1 of the UCC directs courts to liberally construe the statute’s
provisions to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.261 The same section sets forth the
policies of the UCC, which include simplification, clarification, and modernization of the law governing commercial transactions.262 Sometimes, the evolution
of new methods of doing business require amendments to existing law, and automated disablement is such a method.
As explained in the Introduction and throughout this Article, the most
common use of remote disablement as a creditor remedy is in sub-prime auto
lending. That is cause enough to regulate its use, and our law has long attempted to restrict creditor overreach in consumer transactions. Automation is nothing all that new, but today’s automated processes combined with goods connected to networks opens up vast possibilities for lenders in managing the risk
of borrower default. It is time to modernize commercial law to manage the risks
of creditor overreach in exercising remedies that cross the digital–physical divide.
258
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260 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 77, 154
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